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Cutting	the	Gordian	Knot	of	Futility:	A	Case	for	Law	Reform	
on	Unilateral	Withholding	and	Withdrawal	of	Potentially	
Life‐Sustaining	Treatment	
	
Jocelyn	Downie,	Lindy	Willmott	and	Ben	White	
	
	
1. Introduction	
	
In	Australia	and	New	Zealand,	courts,	hospitals,	health	care	professionals,	patients,	
and	 their	 families	 and	 friends	 are	wrestling	with	 gut‐wrenching	 conflicts	 that	 can	
arise	when	the	health	care	team	believes	that	treatment	should	not	be	provided	and	
the	patient’s	loved	ones	believe	that	it	should.		Occasionally,	details	of	specific	cases	
spill	 over	 into	 the	media,	 engaging	 the	public	 in	 the	often‐heated	debate.	 	 Talk	 of	
‘unrealistic	expectations’,	‘false	hope’,	and	‘futility’	abounds	and	tests	for	defensible	
withholding	or	withdrawal	of	treatment,	such	as	‘a	reasonable	prospect	of	returning	
a	 patient	 to	 a	 meaningful	 quality	 of	 life’	 and	 ‘accepted	 medical	 practice’,	 are	
proposed.			
	
In	 this	paper,	we	will	 attempt	 to	 take	a	 step	back	 from	 the	drama	and	vitriol	 and	
suggest	 an	 approach	 to	 law	 and	 policy	 reform	 grounded	 in	 identification	 of	 core	
values,	careful	conceptual	analysis,	and	a	dose	of	humility	and	pragmatism.		To	that	
end,	 we	 reflect	 on	 the	 core	 values	 that	 do	 (or	 should)	 underpin	 a	 regulatory	
framework	for	deciding	on	whether	potentially	life‐sustaining	treatment	should	be	
withheld	or	withdrawn.		These	values	and	the	ways	to	balance	these	values	against	
each	 other	 are	 drawn	 from	 legislation,	 the	 common	 law	 and	 conventions	 and	
treaties	that	have	been	ratified	by	Australia	and	New	Zealand.1	We	then	summarise	
the	 legal	 context	 in	 Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand	 within	 which	 the	 ethical	 debate	
about	 the	 unilateral	 withholding	 and	 withdrawal	 of	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	
treatment	 is	 situated;	 and	we	undertake	a	 critique	of	 that	 law	as	against	 the	 core	
values	that	we	have	articulated.		Finally,	we	offer	a	proposal	for	how	the	law	might	
be	reformed	such	that	it	will	more	closely	align	with	the	core	values	it	is	supposed	to	
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serve	 by	 shifting	 the	 decision‐making	 authority	 from	 doctors	 to	 patients	 and	
substitute	decision‐makers.		These	proposals	would	be	suitable	for	adults	with	and	
without	decision‐making	capacity,	as	well	as	for	children.		We	hope	that	in	the	end	
this	field	might	move	from	friction	to	accord	and,	ultimately,	to	better	care	for	both	
the	living	and	the	dying.	
	
We	note	finally	that	this	paper	focuses	on	the	unilateral	withholding	and	withdrawal	
of	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment.	 	 This	 is	 where	 a	 doctor	 withholds	 or	
withdraws	 treatment	 without	 consent	 from	 a	 patient	 or	 patient’s	 substitute	
decision‐maker	(‘sdm’)2	(where	the	patient	lacks	capacity),	or	authorization	from	a	
court	 or	 tribunal,	 or	 by	 operation	 of	 a	 statute	 or	 justifiable	 government	 or	
institutional	 policy.	 	 In	 other	 words,	 where	 a	 doctor	 withholds	 or	 withdraws	
treatment	on	his	or	her	own	authority.	
	
2. Values	that	govern	this	area	of	law	
	
When	doctors	and	patients	(or	their	sdm)	disagree	on	whether	treatment	should	be	
provided,	it	is	critical	to	have	laws	and	policies	in	place	that	can	resolve	the	impasse.		
So	that	all	involved	can	have	confidence	in	the	outcome	reached,	it	is	important	for	
such	 laws	 and	 policies	 to	 be	 appropriate.	 	 Just	 what	 the	 regulatory	 framework	
should	 look	like	requires	a	step	back	to	consider	the	values	that	are	 implicated	 in,	
and	 should	 ground,	 law	 and	 policy	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 unilateral	
withholding	 and	withdrawal	 of	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment.	 	 In	 our	 view,	
these	 values	 include	 life,	 autonomy,	 equality,	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 distributive	 justice,	
procedural	 fairness,	 access	 to	 justice,	 conscience	 and	 humility.	 	 A	 detailed	
examination	of	each	of	these	values	and	the	balancing	of	them	against	each	other	is	
not	possible	in	a	paper	of	this	length	but	we	note	the	legal	sources	for	each	of	them	
drawing	either	on	 the	 law	 that	governs	end	of	 life	decision‐making	or	 the	general	
principles	that	underpin	our	broader	legal	system.		We	consider	each	of	these	values	
in	turn.	
	
	
2.1	 Life	
	
Our	 starting	 point	 is	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 value	 of	 human	 life	 is	
recognised	by	the	common	law.		In	Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland,	the	House	of	Lords	
accepted	 that	 ‘sanctity	 of	 life’	 formed	 part	 of	 the	 English	 legal	 system3	 and	
Australian	 and	 New	 Zealand	 courts	 have	 also	 recognised	 the	 State’s	 interest	 in	
preserving	human	life.4		However,	this	is	not	an	absolute	value.		The	law	in	Australia	
																																																								
2	We	use	this	term	as	a	generic	one	as	there	are	different	titles	given	in	various	jurisdictions	to	
individuals	who	are	legally	authorised	to	give	or	refuse	consent	to	medical	treatment	on	behalf	of	an	
individual	who	is	incompetent.			
3	Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	AC	789,	859.	
4	In	Australia,	see	for	example,	Hunter	and	New	England	Area	Health	Service	v	A	(2009)	74	NSWLR	88,	
[5]‐[16],	and	more	recently	a	reference	by	a	majority	of	the	Australian	High	Court	in	Patel	v	The	
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and	New	 Zealand	 (and	 indeed	 in	many	 common	 law	 jurisdictions	 throughout	 the	
world)	 also	 recognises	 that	 the	 value	 of	 an	 individual’s	 life	 can	 sometimes	 be	
outweighed	by	the	disvalue	of	their	suffering.		In	other	words,	a	person	may	decide	
that	 life	 is	 no	 longer	 worth	 living.	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 law	 allows	 a	 competent	
individual	 to	 refuse	 treatment,	 even	 if	 that	 treatment	 is	necessary	 to	preserve	 life	
and	 is	recommended	by	doctors.5	 	Where	a	person	has	completed	a	valid	advance	
directive,6	and,	in	some	cases,	where	an	sdm	refuses	treatment,7	the	law	also	allows	
treatment	to	be	withheld	from	a	person	who	lacks	decision‐making	capacity.	
	
A	defensible	approach	to	the	issue	of	withholding	and	withdrawal	of	potentially	life‐
sustaining	 treatment	 should	 therefore	 recognise	 the	 intrinsic	 value	 of	 life,	 the	
possibility	of	instrumental	value	for	life	(for	the	individual	and	those	the	individual	
cares	 about),	 but	 also	 the	 fact	 that	 other	 values	 can	 outweigh	 the	 intrinsic	 and	
instrumental	value	(if	any)	of	life	for	a	particular	individual	(for	example,	the	value	
of	respecting	autonomy,	discussed	below).	
	
2.2	 Autonomy	
	
																																																																																																																																																																					
Queen	to	‘the	value	the	law	places	on	human	life’:	(2012)	290	ALR	189,	[87].	In	New	Zealand,	the	
value	that	the	law	places	on	human	life	was	recognised	in	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney‐
General	NZ	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	244‐245	in	the	context	of	withdrawing	treatment.		It	is	also	evidenced	
by	comments	made	by	sentencing	judges	in	the	criminal	law	context	where	the	convicted	person	has	
unlawfully	killed	another.		See,	for	example,	R	v	O	[2012]	NZHC	796,	[18];	R	v	John	Tahana	Rawiri	and	
Ors	[2009]	NZHC	1036,	[94];	R	v	Crutchley	[2008]	NZHC	1078,	[65];	Martin	v	R	[2005]	NZCA	3,	[136];	
R	v	Erstich	[2002]	NZCA	122,	[26].	
5	See,	for	example,	Brightwater	Care	Group	(Inc)	v	Rossiter	(2009)	40	WAR	84;	Re	B	(Adult:	Refusal	of	
Medical	Treatment)	[2002]	2	All	ER	449;	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney‐General	NZ	[1993]	1	
NZLR	235,	245;	Smith	v	Auckland	Hospital	Board	[1965]	NZLR	191,	219.	
6	See	generally	Lindy	Willmott,	Ben	White	and	Shih‐Ning	Then,	‘Withholding	and	Withdrawing	Life‐
Sustaining	Medical	Treatment’	in	Ben	White,	Fiona	McDonald	and	Lindy	Willmott	(eds),	Health	Law	
in	Australia	(Thomson	Reuters,	2010)	[13.100]	(the	common	law),	[13.150]‐[13.170];	PDG	Skegg,	
‘Justifications	for	Treatment	without	Consent’	in	PDG	Skegg	and	R	Paterson	(eds),	Medical	Law	in	
New	Zealand	(Thomson	Brookers,	2006)	231,	Lindy	Willmott,	Ben	White	and	Ben	Matthews,	‘Law,	
autonomy	and	advance	directives’	(2010)	18	Journal	of	Law	and	Medicine	366,	Phillipa	J	Malpas,	
‘Advance	directives	and	older	people:	ethical	challenges	in	the	promotion	of	advance	directives	in	
New	Zealand’	(2011)	37(5)	Journal	of	Medical	Ethics	285.	See	also	the	Health	and	Disability	
Commissioner’s	Code	of	Health	and	Disability	Services	Consumers'	Rights	Regulation	1996	(NZ),	Right	
7(5)	which	recognises	the	right	of	a	person	to	use	an	advance	directive	in	accordance	with	the	
common	law.		See	also	Hunter	and	New	England	Area	Health	Service	v	A	(2009)	74	NSWLR	88	which	
recognised	the	right	of	a	competent	adult	to	make	a	binding	advance	directive.	
7	See	generally	Lindy	Willmott,	Ben	White	and	Shih‐Ning	Then,	‘Withholding	and	Withdrawing	Life‐
Sustaining	Medical	Treatment’	in	Ben	White,	Fiona	McDonald	and	Lindy	Willmott	(eds),	Health	Law	
in	Australia	(Thomson	Reuters,	2010)	[13.180]‐[13.230],	[13.300];	PDG	Skegg,	‘Omissions	to	Prolong	
Life’	in	PDG	Skegg	and	R	Paterson	(eds),	Medical	Law	in	New	Zealand	(Thomson	Brookers,	2006)	551‐
552.		Although	note	in	New	Zealand,	pursuant	to	section	18	of	the	Protection	of	Personal	and	Property	
Rights	Act	1988	(NZ),	a	sdm	under	that	Act	may	not	refuse	consent	to	‘any	standard	medical	
treatment	or	procedure	intended	to	save	that	person’s	life	or	to	prevent	serious	damage	to	that	
person’s	health’.	
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The	principle	of	respect	for	autonomy	is	a	fundamental	part	of	Australian	and	New	
Zealand	 common	 law.	 	 For	 example,	 Gummow,	 Heydon	 and	 Hayne	 JJ	 in	 Stuart	 v	
Kirkland‐Veenstra	 recognised,	 in	 the	 context	of	 a	negligence	action,	 ‘an	underlying	
value	of	the	common	law	which	gives	primacy	to	personal	autonomy’8	and	observed	
that	personal	autonomy	is	‘a	value	that	informs	much	of	the	common	law’.9		There	is	
also	Australian	authority	 for	 this	proposition	 specifically	 in	 the	end	of	 life	 setting.	
For	 example,	 in	 Brightwater	 Care	 Group	 (Inc)	 v	 Rossiter,	 Martin	 CJ	 refers	 to	 the	
‘common	 law	principle	 of	 autonomy	 and	 self‐determination’10	 and	 also	 notes	 that	
the	 principle	 is	 ‘well	 established	 at	 common	 law’.11	 In	 that	 case,	 a	 man	 with	
quadriplegia	 was	 being	 kept	 alive	 by	 the	 delivery	 of	 artificial	 nutrition	 and	
hydration	through	a	tube	into	his	stomach.		He	was	not	in	the	terminal	phase	of	an	
illness	 and,	 provided	 the	 treatment	 was	 given,	 he	 would	 have	 continued	 to	 live.		
Nevertheless,	 he	 decided	 that	 he	 no	 longer	 wished	 to	 receive	 such	 medical	
treatment	and	 the	Western	Australian	Supreme	Court	 recognised	his	 right	 to	 self‐
determination	by	declaring	that	it	would	be	lawful	to	withdraw	the	treatment.	
	
In	 New	 Zealand,	 autonomy	 underpins	 the	 ability	 of	 a	 person	 to	 refuse	 medical	
treatment,	a	right	that	is	embedded	in	its	Bill	of	Rights,12	and	is	recognised	in	case	
law.13		
	
We	note	that	the	concept	of	‘autonomy’	has	many	different	meanings	in	law.14		In	the	
context	 of	 refusals	 of	 treatment,	 autonomy	 has	 generally	 been	 interpreted	 in	
Australia	and	New	Zealand	as	the	narrow	right	to	prevent	physical	interference	with	
one’s	bodily	integrity.15		This	is	what	requires	a	refusal	of	treatment	to	be	respected	
at	 law.	 	 A	 wider	 view,	 a	 right	 to	 self‐determination,	 involves	 having	 one’s	 will	
																																																								
8	Stuart	v	Kirkland‐Veenstra	(2009)	237	CLR	215,	[87].		
9	Stuart	v	Kirkland‐Veenstra	(2009)	237	CLR	215,	[88].	See	also,	for	example,	Cole	v	South	Tweed	
Heads	Rugby	Club	(2004)	217	CLR	469,	[14]	(Gleeson	CJ);	Perre	v	Apand	Pty	Ltd	(1999)	198	CLR	180,	
[88]	(McHugh	J).	
10	Brightwater	Care	Group	(Inc)	v	Rossiter	(2009)	40	WAR	84,	[48].	
11	Ibid	[24].		For	other	examples,	see	H	Ltd	v	J	(2010)	107	SASR	352,	369	and	the	heading	‘Common	
law	right	to	self‐determination’	at	364;	and	Hunter	and	New	England	Area	Health	Service	v	A	(2009)	
74	NSWLR	88,	[5].	
12	New	Zealand	Bill	of	Rights	1990	(NZ),	s	11.		
13	See,	for	example,	Re	G	[1997]	2	NZLR	201,	210.	
14	In	philosophy,	it	has	even	more	different	meanings.		For	example,	contrast	the	conception	of	
autonomy	articulated	by	John	Stuart	Mill	(a	liberal	individualist)	in	On	Liberty	(Longman,	Roberts	&	
Green,	4th	ed,	1869)	with	that	articulated	by	Susan	Sherwin	(a	feminist	relational	theorist)	in	'A	
Relational	Approach	to	Autonomy	in	Health	Care'	in	Susan	Sherwin	(ed),	The	Politics	of	Women's	
Health:	Exploring	Agency	and	Autonomy	(Temple	University	Press,	1998)	19.		However,	given	that,	as	
explained	earlier,	we	are	grounding	the	values	used	in	the	analysis	in	the	values	as	embraced	and	
understood	by	the	legal	system,	we	do	not	include	a	discussion	of	the	full	range	of	possible	meanings	
here.	
15See,	for	example,	Secretary,	Department	of	Health	and	Community	Services	(NT)	v	JWB	and	SMB	
(Marion’s	Case)	(1992)	175	CLR	218,	232‐233,	265,	309‐210;	Hunter	and	New	England	Area	Health	
Service	v	A	[2009]	NSWSC	761,	[5],	[17];	Brightwater	Care	Group	(Inc)	v	Rossiter		(2009)	40	WAR	84	
at	[23],	[24],	[26],	[31]‐[32];	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney‐General	(NZ)	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	
245;	Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	AC	789,	826	(Lord	Hoffman),	857	(Lord	Keith),	864	(Lord	
Goff).	
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respected	 and	 acted	 upon	 and	 would	 include	 the	 ability	 to	 determine	 that	 they	
receive	particular	treatment.16				It	is	this	latter	view	of	autonomy	that	we	consider	
to	 be	 the	 relevant	 value	 that	 should	 inform	 a	 model	 dealing	 with	 decisions	 to	
withhold	or	withdraw	potentially	life‐sustaining	treatment.					
	
We	see	the	case	for	the	embrace	of	this	wider	sense	of	autonomy	as	resting	on	the	
central	place	of	autonomy	in	contemporary	society.	 	Autonomy	is	so	entrenched	in	
our	 society	 generally	 and	 in	 medical	 decision‐making	 (particularly	 end	 of	 life	
decision‐making),	that	to	exclude	it	would	be	indefensible.		If	the	narrower	view	of	
autonomy	set	out	above	 is	 taken,	 the	concept	of	autonomy	can	play	no	role	 in	 the	
debate	 about	 unilateral	withholding	 and	withdrawal.	 	While	 the	 narrow	 view	 has	
received	firm	and	unwavering	support	in	law,	it	is	not	sufficient	here	as	we	are	not	
considering	 refusals	 of	 treatment.	 	 Therefore	 it	 is	 only	 if	we	 contemplate	 a	wider	
view	 of	 autonomy	 that	 this	 concept	 can	 play	 a	 role.	 	 Accordingly,	 we	 include	
autonomy	as	a	relevant	value	for	designing	a	model	for	decision‐making	in	this	area	
and	by	this	we	mean	autonomy	in	the	wider	sense	of	having	one’s	will	respected	and	
acted	 upon.	 	 That	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 a	 person’s	 right	 of	 self‐determination	 should	
always	 be	 determinative;	 that	 right	 is	 subject	 to	 competing	 claims	 (which	will	 be	
considered	below).	
	
It	must	be	noted	here	that	the	patient	will	not	be	competent	in	most	of	the	cases	at	
issue	in	this	paper.		Therefore,	insofar	as	autonomy	is	a	relevant	value,	we	are	often	
dealing	 with	 past	 autonomy	 as	 expressed	 through	 advance	 directives	 and	 sdms	
where	the	sdm	is	able	to	represent	the	patient’s	wishes	or	values.		For	example,	an	
individual	may	be	 an	Orthodox	 Jew	and	believe	 that	one	must	pursue	all	 possible	
means	to	prolong	life	and	so	might	wish	treatment	even	in	the	face	of	a	persistent	
vegetative	state.	 	Or	an	 individual	may	believe	that	 it	would	be	very	important	 for	
the	psychological	well‐being	of	her	children	to	be	able	to	say	goodbye	to	her	while	
she	is	still	alive	even	if	she	is	unconscious,	and	so	she	would	want	ongoing	treatment	
until	 such	 time	 as	 her	 children	 could	 get	 to	 the	 hospital	 to	 say	 goodbye.	 	 An	
individual	might	believe	that	Chinese	remedies	can	cure	cancer	and	want	aggressive	
Western	 interventions	 for	 the	 window	 of	 time	 it	 might	 take	 for	 the	 Chinese	
remedies	to	have	a	chance	to	be	effective.		In	all	of	these	cases,	the	doctors	and/or	
the	patient’s	family	might	not	wish	for	treatment	to	continue	but	doing	so	would	be	
respectful	of	the	patient’s	past	autonomy.	
	
																																																								
16	See	Loane	Skene,	‘Disputes	about	the	Withdrawal	of	Treatment:	the	Role	of	the	Courts’	(2004)	32	
Journal	of	Law	Medicine	and	Ethics	701	where	she	comments	on	the	narrow	and	wide	interpretations	
of	the	concept	of	autonomy	in	the	context	of	decisions	about	withholding	and	withdrawing	life‐
sustaining	medical	treatment.		The	wider	approach	to	autonomy	was	adopted	by	Justice	Munby	at	
first	instance	in	R	(Burke)	v	General	Medical	Council	[2005]	QB	424,	[130]	where	he	commented	that	
article	8	of	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998	means	that	it	is	for	a	competent	patient	to	decide	the	
treatment	he	or	she	should	or	should	not	be	given.		Note	however	Munby	J’s	decision	and	this	more	
expansive	approach	to	autonomy	was	overturned	by	the	Court	of	Appeal:	R	(Burke)	v	General	Medical	
Council	[2006]	QB	273.	
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Given	the	fundamental	commitment	to	respect	for	autonomy,	a	defensible	approach	
to	the	 issue	of	withholding	and	withdrawal	of	potentially	 life‐sustaining	treatment	
should	recognise	that	autonomy	is	violated	where	treatment	is	unilaterally	withheld	
or	withdrawn	 against	 the	wishes	 of	 the	 patient	 (or	 sdm),	 and	 should	 only	 permit	
such	violation	where	justified	by	reference	to	some	higher	value(s).	
	
2.3	 Equality		
	
The	legal	landscape	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand	demonstrates	the	commitment	of	
these	 countries	 to	 the	 value	 of	 equality.	 	 Over	 recent	 decades,	 Australia	 and	New	
Zealand	have	become	signatories	to	various	conventions	and	treaties,	including	the	
Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities,	which	support	and	promote	
the	 value	 of	 equality,17	 and	 have	 enacted	 human	 rights18	 and	 anti‐discrimination	
legislation.19	 These	 instruments	 aim	 not	 only	 to	 prevent	 discrimination	 against	
people	with	disabilities,	but	 they	also	strive	to	ensure	such	individuals	receive	the	
same	standard	of	health	care	as	the	able‐bodied.		They	also	prohibit	discrimination	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 race	 or	 culture.	 	 Underpinning	 such	 instruments	 is	 recognition	 of	
racial	 and	 cultural	 diversity	 within	 our	 communities,	 and	 the	 need	 for	 society	 to	
accept	and	respect		diversity.	
	
The	value	of	equality	is	or	can	be	critical	when	considering	decisions	to	withhold	or	
withdraw	potentially	 life‐sustaining	treatment.	 	This	is	particularly	the	case	where	
the	individual	has	a	significant	intellectual	or	physical	impairment.		There	is	a	very	
real	 risk	 that	 the	 attitudes	 of	 those	 who	 are	 able‐bodied	 towards	 disability	 will	
inappropriately	colour	their	perception	of	what	is	in	the	best	interests	of	patients	in	
at	least	two	ways	that	are	contrary	to	the	value	of	equality.		First,	they	may	misjudge	
the	quality	of	the	life	of	the	individual	in	front	of	them	(the	quality	as	experienced	by	
the	 individual).20	 	 The	 case	 of	 Baroness	 Jane	 Campbell	 provides	 a	 concerning	
example	 of	 presumptions	 that	 can	 be	 made	 by	 doctors.	 	 Baroness	 Campbell	 has	
muscular	atrophy	and	was	rushed	to	the	emergency	department	one	evening	with	
severe	pneumonia.	 	 In	her	view,	doctors	were	not	prepared	to	treat	her	until	 they	
were	 shown	 photos	 of	 her	 receiving	 her	 doctoral	 award.21	 	 Second,	 negative	
																																																								
17	The	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities	was	signed	by	Australia	on	30	March	
2007	and	ratified	on	17	July	2008,	and	signed	by	New	Zealand	on	30	March	2007	and	ratified	on	26	
September	2008.	Pursuant	to	this	Convention,	States	Parties	agree	to	prohibit	all	discrimination	on	
the	basis	of	disability	(Article	5:	Equality	and	Non‐Discrimination)	and	reaffirm	that	every	human	
being	has	the	inherent	right	to	life	(Article	10:	Right	to	Life).	
18	New	Zealand	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990	(NZ);	Charter	of	Human	Rights	and	Responsibilities	Act	2006	
(Vic);	Human	Rights	Act	2004	(ACT).	
19	See,	for	example,	Human	Rights	Act	1993	(NZ);	Disability	Discrimination	Act	1992	(Cth);	Anti‐
Discrimination	Act	1991	(Qld);	Equal	Opportunity	Act	1984	(WA);	Anti‐Discrimination	Act	1977	
(NSW);	Equal	Opportunity	Act	1984	(SA).	
20	This	issue	is	explored	by	Phillip	French	and	Rosemary	Kayess	in	‘Deadly	Currents	Beneath	Calm	
Waters:	Persons	with	Disability	and	the	Right	to	Life	in	Australia’	[2008]	University	of	New	South	
Wales	Faculty	of	Law	Research	Series	34,	[4.8].			
21	The	text	of	her	address	is	available	at	<http://disability‐
studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Campbell‐Withholding‐Treatment1‐Janes‐final‐draft‐8.11.04.pdf>		
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conclusions	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 life	 of	 specific	 individuals	 may	 send	 a	 strong	
message	 to	 other	 individuals	with	 disabilities	 that	 their	 lives	 are	worth	 less	 than	
those	of	the	able‐bodied.22		
	
There	 is	 also	a	 risk	 that	 judgments	will	be	made	 that	discriminate	on	 the	basis	of	
race	 or	 culture.	 	 Health	 care	 professionals	 may	 see	 beliefs	 in	 non‐dominant	
treatments	 as	 completely	 irrational.	 	 They	 may	 see	 beliefs	 about	 the	 value	 of	
continued	 life	 (even	 in	 a	 persistent	 vegetative	 state	 for	 example)	 as	 being	
unreasonable.		This	issue	arose	in	the	Victorian	case	of	Re	Herrington23	in	which	the	
family	of	Ms	King,	an	Aboriginal	woman	in	a	persistent	vegetative	state,	disagreed	
with	 the	 health	 care	 team’s	 decision	 to	 discontinue	 treatment,	 including	 the	
provision	of	antibiotics	and	artificial	nutrition.		The	family’s	position	was	grounded	
in	part	in	Aboriginal	beliefs	in	the	provision	of	food	and	drink	and	‘caring	for	people	
who	are	unwell.’24	After	 stating	 that	he	had	 ‘considered	everything	 said	about	 the	
cultural	values	of	Aboriginal	society	by	them	[the	patient’s	family]	and	by	the	social	
worker’,25	Justice	Williams	ultimately	deferred	to	the	doctors’	opinion.26	
	
Careful	 attention	 must	 be	 paid	 to	 ensuring	 cultural	 competence27	 (or,	 as	 it	 is	
sometimes	 known	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 cultural	 safety)	 so	 as	 to	 protect	 and	 promote	
equality	with	respect	to	race	or	culture.		This	means	that	decision‐makers	in	the	face	
of	conflicts	between	doctors	and	patients’	 families	must	understand	(or	be	able	 to	
come	 to	 understand	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 proceeding)	 the	 relevant	 cultural	
components	 of	 positions	 being	 taken	 by	 others.	 	 Circling	 back	 to	 disability,	 they	
must	also	understand	(or	be	able	to	come	to	understand)	the	ways	in	which	people	
who	 are	 differently	 abled	 than	 themselves	 perceive	 disability.	 	 In	 sum,	 they	must	
																																																																																																																																																																					
Similar	concerns	were	expressed	by	the	New	South	Wales	Ombudsman	in	New	South	Wales	
Ombudsman,	Report	of	Reviewable	Deaths	in	2005	Volume	1:	Deaths	of	people	with	disabilities	
(November	2006)	
<http://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/5191/ARReviewableDeaths_disability
2005.pdf>.		See	also	Pauline	Heslop	et	al	,	Confidential	Inquiry	into	premature	deaths	of	people	with	
learning	disabilities	(2013)	<http://www.bris.ac.uk/cipold/fullfinalreport.pdf>		
22		Jocelyn	Downie	and	Karen	McEwen,	‘The	Manitoba	College	of	Physicians	and	Surgeons	Position	
Statement	on	Withholding	and	Withdrawal	of	Life‐Sustaining	Treatment	(2008):	Three	Problems	and	
a	Solution’	(2009)	17	Health	Law	Journal	115.		
23	In	the	matter	of	Herrington;	Re	King	[2007]	VSC	151.	
24	In	the	matter	of	Herrington;	Re	King	[2007]	VSC	151,	[18].	
25	In	the	matter	of	Herrington;	Re	King	[2007]	VSC	151,	[23].	
26	In	the	matter	of	Herrington;	Re	King	[2007]	VSC	151,	[24].	
27	For	the	importance	of	cultural	competency	in	the	delivery	of	health	care	generally,	see	Victorian	
Department	of	Health,	Cultural	Response	Framework	(2009)	
<http://www.health.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/381068/cultural_responsiveness.pdf>;	
Sarah	Stewart,	Cultural	Competence	in	Health	Care	(Position	Paper,	Diversity	Health	Institute,	2006)	
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.110.8602&rep=rep1&type=pdf	>;	
Royal	Australasian	College	of	Physicians,	‘An	Introduction	to	Cultural	Competency’	(2006);	National	
Health	and	Medical	Research	Council,	Cultural	Competency	in	Health:	A	guide	for	policy,	partnerships	
and	participation	(Australian	Government,	2005)	
<http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/_files_nhmrc/publications/attachments/hp19.pdf>.		For	the	importance	
of	cultural	competency	in	the	specific	field	of	end	of	life,	see	Katherine	Clark	and	Jane	Phillips,	‘End	of	
life	care:	The	importance	of	culture	and	ethnicity’	(2010)	39(4)	Australian	Family	Physician	210.	
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also	 avoid	 basing	 unilateral	 decisions	 (inasmuch	 as	 they	 are	 permitted)	 on	
discriminatory	beliefs	or	attitudes	and	must	be	alert	 to	patterns	of	discrimination	
(including	indirect	discrimination)	in	practice	and	policy.	
	
2.4	 Rule	of	law	
	
A	 fundamental	 plank	 of	 the	 legal	 system	 in	 both	 Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand	 is	
adherence	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law.28	 	 There	 is	 no	universally	 accepted	definition	of	 the	
rule	of	 law.	However,	 the	Law	Council	of	Australia	has	 identified	a	number	of	key	
principles	which,	together,	articulate	its	understanding	of	the	rule	of	law.		The	first	
of	 these	principles	 states	 that	 ‘the	 law	must	be	both	 readily	known	and	available,	
and	certain	and	clear’.29	
	
The	current	law	in	this	area	poses	a	number	of	challenges	for	this	aspect	of	the	rule	
of	law.		A	review	of	three	Australian	jurisdictions	recently	concluded	that	‘[t]he	law	
governing	the	withholding	and	withdrawing	of	life‐sustaining	treatment	from	adults	
who	 lack	 capacity	 is	 not	 only	 complex,	 it	 is	 also	 at	 times	 uncertain,	 internally	
inconsistent,	 inconsistent	 with	 good	 medical	 and	 ethical	 practice,	 and	
counterintuitive.’30		It	is	uncertainty	in	the	law	that	poses	the	most	serious	threat	to	
the	rule	of	law	in	this	area	of	unilateral	withholding	and	withdrawal	of	treatment.	If,	
after	reasonable	investigation	and	analysis	of	the	law,	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	
what	legal	rights	and	duties	arise,	then	the	state	of	the	law	offends	the	rule	of	law.	
	
But	even	where	the	law	is	capable	of	being	determined,	if	the	state	of	the	law	makes	
doing	so	very	difficult,	this	can	also	threaten	the	requirement	of	the	rule	of	law	that	
the	law	must	be	able	to	be	ascertained.	This	is	particularly	so	in	an	area	of	law	such	
as	unilateral	withholding	and	withdrawal	where	it	is	expected	to	be	used	by	doctors,	
																																																								
28	Lawbook,	The	Laws	of	Australia	(at	16	January	2013)	21	Human	Rights,	‘1	Development	and	
Recognition	of	Human	Rights’	[21.1.140];	Peter	Bailey,	The	Human	Rights	Enterprise	in	Australia	and	
Internationally	(LexisNexis	Butterworths,	2009)	242‐253;	Philip	A	Joseph,	Constitutional	and	
administrative	law	in	New	Zealand	(Thomson	Reuters,	2007)	196‐198;	Justice	John	Toohey	AC,	‘A	
government	of	laws,	and	not	of	men?’	(1993)	4	Public	Law	Review	158,	168‐169.		See	also	Patel	v	
Chief	Executive	of	Department	of	Labour	[1997]	1	NZLR	102,	110‐111;	Australian	Communist	Party	v	
The	Commonwealth	(1951)	83	CLR	1,	60‐61.			
29	Policy	Statement,	Law	Council	of	Australia,	‘Rule	of	Law	Principles’,	2:	
<http://www1.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA‐PDF/a‐z‐
docs/PolicyStatementRuleofLaw.pdf>		See	also	Esther	Majambere,	‘Clarity,	precision	and	
unambiguity:	aspects	for	effective	legislative	drafting’	(2011)	37(3)	Commonwealth	Law	Bulletin	417,	
418‐419,	425;	The	Hon	J	J	Spigelman	AC,	‘Access	to	Justice	and	Access	to	Lawyers’	(2007)	29(2)	
Australian	Bar	Review	136,	143;	Margaret	Jane	Radin,	‘Reconsidering	the	Rule	of	Law’	(1989)	69(4)	
Boston	University	Law	Review	781,	786.	
30	Lindy	Willmott	et	al	,	‘The	legal	role	of	medical	professionals	in	decisions	to	withhold	or	withdraw	
life‐sustaining	treatment:	Part	3	(Victoria)’	(2011)	18	Journal	of	Law	and	Medicine	773,	794.	See	also	
Ben	White	et	al,	‘The	legal	role	of	medical	professionals	in	decisions	to	withhold	or	withdraw	life‐
sustaining	treatment:	Part	1	(New	South	Wales)’	(2011)	18	Journal	of	Law	and	Medicine	497;	Lindy	
Willmott	et	al,	‘The	legal	role	of	medical	professionals	in	decisions	to	withhold	or	withdraw	life‐
sustaining	treatment:	Part	2	(Queensland)’	(2011)	18	Journal	of	Law	and	Medicine	522.	
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other	health	professionals,	patients,	 families	and	carers,	and	the	wider	community	
without	recourse	to	legal	advice.			
	
Another	challenge	to	understanding	the	 law	relates	 to	the	complexity	of	 the	 law	in	
this	area.		The	more	complex	the	legal	principle,	the	greater	the	chance	that	the	law	
will	 not	 be	 understood	 by	 those	who	 are	 subject	 to	 it.	 	 The	 authors	 acknowledge	
there	are	 likely	 to	be	 intractable	complexities	 in	applying	 law	on	withholding	and	
withdrawing	treatment.	For	example,	there	is	a	need	to	regulate	various	situations	
such	 as	whether	 a	 patient	 has	 capacity	 or	 not.	 	 But	 other	 complexity	 arises	 from	
regulation	 in	 this	 area	 being	 spread	 over	 both	 common	 law	 and	 statute	 (and	
sometimes	more	than	one	statute).		
	
A	further	challenge	is	inconsistency.	This	is	related	to	complexity	in	that	inconsistent	
regulation	can	be	 complex	but	 it	poses	additional	problems	 in	 that	 it	 requires	 the	
followers	of	law	to	know	that	similar	situations	are	not	treated	in	a	similar	way	by	
the	law.		In	our	context,	the	decision‐maker	and	criteria	for	decision‐making	in	one	
instance	should	be	the	same	in	an	equivalent	instance.		For	example,	we	consider	it	
makes	no	sense	for	doctors	to	have	powers	of	unilateral	withdrawal	or	withholding	
if	a	person	has	capacity	to	make	decisions	about	their	own	health	care,	but	not	have	
that	power	once	the	person	loses	decision‐making	capacity.31			
	
A	 final	 challenge	 to	understanding	 the	 law	 in	 this	 area	 is	 that	 the	meaning	of	 key	
concepts	 is	 not	 transparent.	 Conceptual	 slipperiness,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	
terms	which	are	key	legal	triggers,	undermines	the	rule	of	law	requirement	that	the	
law	is	ascertainable.	In	section	4	below,	we	consider	how	the	law’s	treatment	of	the	
pivotal	terms	‘futile’	and	‘necessaries	of	life’	undermine	people’s		ability	to	know	and	
apply	the	law.	
	
Given	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 to	 the	 Australian	 and	New	 Zealand	 legal	
systems,	and	the	current	challenges	posed	to	it	by	existing	regulation	of	decisions	to	
withhold	 or	 withdraw	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment,	 this	 is	 an	 important	
value	that	must	drive	the	project	of	law	reform.	
	
2.5	 Distributive	Justice	
	
Another	 consideration	 that	 can	 be	 significant	 in	 cases	 involving	 withholding	 and	
withdrawal	 of	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 resources	 are	
finite.		Resources	of	all	descriptions	including	intensive	care	unit	beds,	dialysis	units,	
organs	for	transplant	are	in	limited	supply,	and	there	will	be	times	when	giving	or	
continuing	 treatment	 for	 one	 patient	 means	 that	 one	 or	 more	 others	 do	 not	 get	
treatment.		In	addition,	a	dollar	spent	on	health	care	may	mean	one	less	dollar	spent	
																																																								
31	See	section	3	(including	section	3.1)	below	where	the	law	is	described.		For	more	detail,	see	Lindy	
Willmott,	Ben	White	and	Jocelyn	Downie,	‘Withholding	and	withdrawal	of	‘futile’	life‐sustaining	
treatment:	Unilateral	medical	decision‐making	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand’	(2013)	20	Journal	of	
Law	and	Medicine	907.		
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on	other	forms	of	social	services.		We	should	not,	however,	hide	from	this	fact.		It	is	
not	 immoral	 to	 ration	 resources.	 It	 happens	 frequently	 and	 it	 is	 necessary:	 no	
country	can	afford	to	provide	all	 that	 is	medically	possible	to	everyone.32	 	But	this	
means	 doctors	 should	 be	 transparent	 and	 not	mask	 issues	 relating	 to	 scarcity	 of	
resources	behind	the	cloak	of	futility.			
	
That	said,	the	allocation	must	be	done	in	a	manner	consistent	with	the	principles	of	
distributive	justice.	 	Within	the	broader	context	of	our	legal	regime,	Mullender	has	
observed	that	‘the	law	is	…	an	institution	that	distributes	a	range	of	valuable	goods	
and	 burdens	 across	 society’.33	 	 Smith	 has	 considered	 the	meaning	 of	 ‘distributive	
justice’	in	the	narrower	context	of	health	care,	and	notes	that	‘so	long	as	restrictive	
levels	 of	 use	 for	 health	 resources	 exist,	 some	 principle	 of	 “maximum	 societal	
benefit”	must	be	set’.34		He	advocates	for	drafting	policies	based	on	the	principles	of	
distributive	justice.35	
	
If	 just	policies	are	in	place,	then	it	can	be	ethically	defensible	to	deny	treatment	to	
some	 individuals.	This	 includes	patients	who	want	and	request	 the	 treatment	 and	
even	those	for	whom	that	treatment	would	be	in	their	best	interests.		The	manner	in	
which	 policies	 on	 rationing	 should	 be	 drafted	 to	 ensure	 distributive	 justice	 is	
considered	next.	
	
2.6	 Procedural	fairness	
	
If	 we	 accept	 that	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 rationing	 of	 health	 care,	 we	 must	 engage	 in	
legitimate	processes	for	designing	resource	allocation	policies.36		The	policies	must	
be	 drafted	 in	 an	 open	 and	 transparent	 fashion	 with	 input	 from	 individuals	 and	
groups	 with	 the	 necessary	 expertise	 (with	 a	 broad	 understanding	 of	 expertise,	
including	experiential	knowledge).	 	Particularly	careful	attention	should	be	paid	to	
include	 the	 perspectives	 of	 the	 very	 individuals	who	 are	most	 likely	 to	 be	 denied	
treatment	on	the	basis	of	 the	policies.	 	Furthermore,	given	the	commitment	to	the	
value	of	equality	discussed	earlier,	any	resource	allocation	policies	which	authorise	
																																																								
32	See	generally	Leonard	M	Fleck,	‘Just	Caring:	Health	Care	Rationing,	Terminal	Illness	and	the	
Medically	Least	Well	Off’	(2011)	39	Journal	of	Law,	Medicine	and	Ethics	156,	157‐161.	
33	Richard	Mullender,	‘Negligence,	the	Personal	Equation	of	Defendants	and	Distributive	Justice’	
(2000)	8	Tort	Law	Review	211,	227.		
34	George	P	Smith	II,	‘Distributive	Justice	and	the	New	Medicine’	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	2008)	17.			
35	George	P	Smith	II,	‘Variables	in	health	care	policy‐making:	Resolving	a	quandary?’	(2009)	17	
Journal	of	Law	and	Medicine	52,	57.		
36	One	model	based	on	‘democratic	deliberation’	has	been	suggested	by	Leonard	M	Fleck,	‘Just	Caring:	
Health	Care	Rationing,	Terminal	Illness,	and	the	Medically	Least	Well	Off’	(2011)	39	Journal	of	Law,	
Medicine	and	Ethics	156.	See	also	Jocelyn	Downie	and	Jennifer	J	Llewellyn,	Being	Relational:	
Reflections	on	Relational	Theory	and	Health	Law	(UBC	Press,	2011),	especially	chapters	2,	3,	8,	and	9	
for	discussions	of	relational	conceptions	of	justice	and	judgment	and	the	application	of	these	
conceptions	to	legitimate	health	policy	decision‐making	processes.		See	also	Norman	Daniels	and	
James	E	Sabin,	Setting	Limits	Fairly:	Learning	to	Share	Resources	for	Health	(Oxford	University	Press,	
2nd	ed,	2008)	for	a	discussion	of	their	“accountability	for	reasonableness”	theory	of	procedural	
justice.	
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doctors	 to	 withhold	 or	 withdraw	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment	 must	 be	
subjected	 to	 rigorous	 equality	 analysis	 prior	 to	 approval.	 	 Further,	 once	 these	
policies	 are	 established,	 they	 must	 be	 challengeable	 in	 the	 courts	 or	 other	
adjudicative	 bodies	 (for	 example,	 for	 being	 discriminatory)	 and	 there	 must	 be	
regulation	of	the	process.	
	
When	 considering	 individual	 decisions	 about	 withholding	 or	 withdrawing	
treatment,	a	procedurally	 fair	decision‐making	process	 is	particularly	relevant	and	
important	because	of	the	benefits	that	come	from	adherence	to	the	‘hearing	rule’.37		
Broadly,	 the	hearing	rule	 requires	 that	a	person	has	adequate	notice	of	a	decision	
that	 is	proposed	 to	be	made,	 access	 to	 relevant	 information	and	sufficient	 time	 to	
consider	it,	and	an	opportunity	to	participate	in	the	decision‐making	process	and	be	
heard.38	 	 Procedurally	 fair	 decision‐making	 is	 important	 because	 it	 increases	 the	
quality	of	decision‐making.		When	all	relevant	information	is	shared	and	discussed,	
this	ensures	that	views,	assumptions	and	conclusions	can	be	rigorously	tested.39		An	
opportunity	 to	 participate	 in	 decision‐making	 can	 also	 lead	 to	 greater	 confidence	
and	trust	in	the	decision	that	is	made40	as	well	as	a	greater	sense	of	 legitimacy	for	
the	final	outcome.			
	
A	legal	framework	dealing	with	decision‐making	about	medical	treatment	at	the	end	
of	 life	 should	 promote	 the	 achievement	 of	 these	 outcomes.	 This	would	mean	 that	
decisions	 about	 not	 treating	 should	 not,	 at	 a	 minimum,	 occur	 in	 isolation	 or	 in	
secret.	 The	 value	 of	 procedurally	 fair	 decision‐making	 requires	 frank	 engagement	
with	 the	patient	or	his	or	her	 sdm,	and	 the	patient	 (or	 sdm)	would	be	part	of	 the	
properly	 informed	 decision‐making	 process	 about	 whether	 treatment	 should	 be	
stopped.	 	The	 importance	of	 the	 treating	 team	consulting	with	 the	patient	 (or	 the	
patient’s	 family)	 in	 decision‐making	 about	 whether	 to	 withhold	 or	 withdraw	
treatment	has	been	widely	recognised	in	academic	commentary41	as	well	as	by	the	
judiciary.42			
																																																								
37	The	second	element	of	procedural	fairness	is	that	the	decision‐maker	is	impartial	or	free	from	bias	
in	his	or	her	decision‐making.		This	aspect	of	procedurally	fair	decision‐making	is	also	important,	but	
it	is	better	dealt	with	in	the	context	of	this	paper	under	the	value	of	‘Equality’	considered	above.	
38	Robin	Creyke,John	McMillan	and	Mark	Smyth,	Control	of	Government	Action:	Text,	Cases	and	
Commentary	(LexisNexis	Butterworths,	3	ed,	2012),	[10.4.7].			
39	DJ	Galligan,	Discretionary	Powers:	A	Legal	Study	of	Official	Discretion	(Clarendon	Press,	1986)	328;	
Geoffrey	A	Flick,	Natural	Justice:	Principles	and	Practical	Application	(Butterworths,	2nd	ed,	1984)	69‐
70.	See	also	Re	Pochi	and	Minister	for	Immigration	and	Ethnic	Affairs	(1979)	26	ALR	247,	274	
(Brennan	J).		
40	E	Allen	Lind	and	Tom	R	Tyler,	The	Social	Psychology	of	Procedural	Justice	(Plenum	Press,	1988)	63–
4.		
41	See,	for	example,	Donna	Casey	and	Thaddeus	Pope,	‘Resolving	Medical	Futility	Disputes’	(2011)	36	
DNA	Reporter	5;	Cameron	Stewart,	‘Futility	determination	as	a	process:	Problems	with	medical	
sovereignty,	legal	issues	and	the	strengths	and	weakness	of	the	procedural	approach’	(2011)	8	
Bioethical	Inquiry	155;	Thaddeus	M	Pope	and	Ellen	A	Waldman,	‘Mediation	at	the	end	of	life:	getting	
beyond	the	limits	of	the	talking	cure’	(2007)	23	Ohio	State	Journal	on	Dispute	Resolution	143;	
Thaddeus	M	Pope,	‘Medical	futility	statutes:	No	safe	harbor	to	unilaterally	refuse	life‐sustaining	
treatment’	(2007)	75	Tennessee	Law	Review	1.		See	also	Joceyln	Downie	and	Karen	McEwen,	‘The	
Manitoba	College	of	Physicians	and	Surgeons	Position	Statement	on	Withholding	and	Withdrawal	of	
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2.7	 Access	to	justice		
	
Access	to	justice	is	an	increasing	problem	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand.43		The	rule	
of	 law	has	been	 identified	as	a	key	value	 in	our	 legal	 system,	but	 this	depends	on	
individuals	having	access	 to	 justice	when	 they	 feel	 their	 legal	 rights	 (or	 those	of	a	
loved	 one)	 have	 been	 infringed.44	 	 Taking	 a	 matter	 to	 court	 is	 daunting	 and	
financially	 prohibitive	 for	most	members	 of	 the	 community.	 	 Delays	 in	 obtaining	
redress	will	sometimes	mean	that	legal	recourse	is	not	a	practical	solution.			
	
These	 systemic	 potential	 barriers	 to	 justice	 can	 arise	 when	 a	 patient	 or,	 more	
commonly,	an	sdm,	wishes	to	challenge	a	doctor’s	decision	to	stop	potentially	 life‐
sustaining	treatment.		Lawyers	and	medical	experts	can	be	prohibitively	expensive,	
putting	the	challenging	of	a	doctor’s	decision	beyond	the	reach	of	some	if	not	many	
or,	indeed,	most.		Power	imbalances	between	doctors	and	hospitals	on	the	one	hand	
and	lay	persons	on	the	other	also	reduce	the	willingness	or	ability	of	some	to	go	to	
court	to	fight	for	what	they	believe	to	be	in	the	best	interests	of	their	loved	ones.			
	
Furthermore,	just	as	the	resources	of	the	patients	and	their	families	are	limited	(as	
noted	above)	and	 the	resources	of	 the	health	care	system	are	 limited	(as	noted	 in	
the	discussion	of	 distributive	 justice	 earlier),	 so	 too	 are	 the	 resources	of	 the	 legal	
system.	 	There	are	not	enough	lawyers	who	understand	the	complexities	of	end	of	
life	law	and	policy	and	the	court	system	is	severely	strained	to	deal	just	with	what	is	
already	before	it.	 	One	should	not	establish	a	process	that	is	too	resource‐intensive	
for	 the	 system	 to	 bear.	 	 It	would	not	 be	 practical,	 for	 example,	 to	 require	 that	 all	
decisions	to	stop	treatment	(whether	with	consent	or	not)	be	reviewed	by	a	judge	or	
tribunal.		That	said,	it	is	also	very	important	to	be	pragmatic	about	how	many	cases	
would	 actually	 not	 be	 able	 to	 be	 resolved	 through	 effective	 communication	
strategies	and	conflict	resolution	mechanisms.	 	We	predict	 that	 it	would	be	a	very	
																																																																																																																																																																					
Life‐Sustaining	Treatment	(2008):	Three	Problems	and	a	Solution’	(2009)	17	Health	Law	Journal	115	
where	the	authors	proposed	not	only	that	the	patient	or	family	be	consulted,	but	that	continuing	
treatment	should	be	provided	at	the	request	of	the	patient	or	sdm	in	the	absence	of	a	resource	
allocation	policy	or	court	order.	
42	See,	for	example,	Shortland	v	Northland	Health	Ltd	[1998]	1	NZLR	433,	443	where	the	Court	of	
Appeal	observed	the	need	for	there	to	be	‘reasonable	consultation	with	the	patient	and	such	
members	of	the	family	as	are	available’.			
43	Geoff	Mulherin	and	Christine	Coumarelos,	‘Access	to	Justice	and	Disadvantaged	Communities’	in	
Pascoe	Pleasence,	Alexy	Buck	and	Nigel	J	Balmer	(eds)	Transforming	Lives:	Law	and	Social	Process	
(Stationery	Office,	2007)	9.	For	comment	on	the	effects	of	costs	on	access	to	justice,	see	also	K	
McEvoy,	‘Access	to	Justice’	(2005)	17(4)	Legal	Date	1;	The	Hon	JJ	Spigelman	AC,	‘Access	to	Justice	and	
Access	to	Lawyers’	(2007)	29(2)	Australian	Bar	Review	136;	The	Hon	Murray	Gleeson	AC,	‘The	
purpose	of	litigation’	(2009)	83	Australian	Law	Journal	61.	
44	The	Honourable	Sir	Anthony	Mason	AC	KBE,	‘PILCH:	Access	to	Justice	and	the	Rule	of	Law’	(Speech	
delivered	at	the	PILCH	(Public	Interest	Law	Clearing	House)	10th	Anniversary	Dinner,	Parliament	
House,	Melbourne,	9	September	2004)	
<http://www.vicbar.com.au/GetFile.ashx?file=VicBarNewsFiles/130PILCH.pdf>.	
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small	number.45	 	Doctors	who	wish	to	treat	a	patient	against	 the	patient’s	 family’s	
wishes	must,	in	most	cases,	go	to	court	or	tribunal	for	consent	and	this	is	not	seen	to	
overwhelm	the	system.	 	There	is	no	reason	to	suppose	that	the	numbers	would	be	
higher	for	demands	than	for	refusals.		That	said,	the	system	should	be	designed	to	be	
as	quick,	effective,	and	efficient	as	it	can	be	while	serving	the	values	outlined	in	this	
section.46	
	
Statutes	can	create	rules,	structures,	and	systems	that	reduce	the	need	to	go	to	court	
by	 creating	 efficient	 and	 accessible	 ways	 of	 resolving	 disputes.	 	 One	 principle	 of	
access	to	justice	is	that	law	should	provide	a	framework	for	dispute	resolution	that	
reduces	 the	 need	 for	 judicial	 intervention.	 This	 is	 an	 efficiency	 point	 in	 that	
requiring	judicial	intervention	in	every	case	is	impractical	in	terms	of	time,	cost,	and	
scarce	legal	system	resources.		It	is	also	an	access	to	justice	issue	as	individuals	are	
unlikely	 to	 be	 able	 to	 contest	 in	 court	 as	 effectively	 as	 well‐resourced	 health	
institutions.		There	is	also	evidence	that	points	to	the	value	of	avoiding	the	stress	of	
litigation	and	the	harm	it	can	cause	patients	and	their	families.47	
	
Nevertheless,	intractable	disputes	will	arise	under	any	proposed	model.		When	this	
does	occur,	the	value	of	access	to	justice	suggests	that	there	should	be	efficient	and	
accessible	mechanisms,	such	as	tribunals	to	assist	with	resolving	the	deadlock.48		
	
2.8	 Conscience	
	
An	 individual’s	 freedom	 of	 conscience	 is	 recognised	 both	 in	 Australia	 and	 New	
Zealand.49	 	 The	 value	 of	 conscience	 can	 be	 implicated	 in	 cases	 of	 conflict	 over	
																																																								
45	Recently,	some	work	has	been	undertaken	in	New	South	Wales	to	assist	in	resolving	conflicts	that	
arise	in	end	of	life	settings.		In	its	final	Report,	‘Conflict	Resolution	in	End	of	Life	Settings’	(CRELS)	
Report	2010,	the	working	party	observed	as	follows:	‘The	Courts	and	tribunals	will	always	be	needed	
to	resolve	a	very	small	proportion	of	intractable	EOL	conflict.	This	is	however,	a	rare	occurrence,	
especially	when	considered	in	relation	to	the	level	of	activity	around	end	of	life	decisions	in	the	NSW	
public	health	system.	While	it	is	difficult	to	estimate	accurately,	there	are	probably	hundreds	of	EOL	
decisions	made	every	day	across	care	settings	in	NSW.’	
46	The	trend	in	Australia	has	been	the	establishment	of	tribunals	which	provide	quicker	and	cheaper	
access	to	justice	than	occurs	under	the	judicial	system.		This	can	be	seen	from	the	objectives	of	the	
legislation	establishing	tribunals:	see,	for	example,	Queensland	Civil	and	Administrative	Tribunal	Act	
2009	(Qld),	s	3(b);	State	Administrative	Tribunal	Act	2009	(WA),	s	9;	ACT	Civil	and	Administrative	
Tribunal	Act	2008	(ACT),	s	6;	Guardianship	Act	1987	(NSW),	s	55.	
47	Nicole	M	Zapzalka,	The	psychological	impact	of	civil	litigation:	A	comparison	of	perceived	anxiety	
levels	in	civil	litigation	as	viewed	by	trial	and	alternative	dispute	resolution	litigants	(Capella	
University,	2007)	74‐75;	Larry	H.	Strasburger,	MD,	‘The	Litigant‐Patient:	Mental	Health	
Consequences	of	civil	litigation’	(1999)	27	Journal	of	the	American	Academy	of	Psychiatry	and	the	Law	
203.	
48	To	a	large	extent,	this	already	occurs	in	the	various	Australian	jurisdictions.	See	note	46	above	and	
accompanying	text.		See	also	New	South	Wales,	CRELS	Project	Working	Group,	Conflict	Resolution	in	
End	of	Life	Settings	(CRELS)	Final	Report	(2010)	5.		It	is	not	yet	occurring	in	New	Zealand	where	cases	
are	dealt	with	in	the	Family	Court	or	the	High	Court.			
49	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	opened	for	signature	16	December	1966,	999	
UNTS	171	art	18	(signed	by	Australia	on	18	December	1972	and	ratified	on	13	August	1980,	and	
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withholding	 and	withdrawal.	 	 The	 health	 care	 professional	may	 feel	 that	 ongoing	
treatment	is	not	only	not	in	the	patient’s	best	interests	but	to	provide	the	treatment	
would	 run	 counter	 to	 the	 health	 care	 professional’s	 conscience.	 	 The	 provision	 of	
treatment	that	the	doctor	considers	to	be	futile,	 thereby	depriving	another	patient	
or	 patients	 those	 health	 resources,	 may	 also	 be	 contrary	 to	 that	 person’s	
conscience.50		To	compel	the	health	care	professional	to	provide	treatment	would	be	
a	violation	of	that	person’s	freedom	of	conscience.			
	
However,	 the	 request	 of	 a	 patient	 (or	 the	 patient’s	 sdm)	 for	 treatment	 may	 be	
motivated	 by	 their	 conscience	 (hence	 calling	 for	 the	 weighing	 of	 one	 person’s	
conscience	 against	 another’s)	 or	may	 be	 an	 expression	 of	 their	 autonomy	 (hence	
calling	 for	 the	weighing	 of	 one	 person’s	 conscience	 against	 another’s	 autonomy).		
We	 would	 argue	 that,	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 meet	 the	 request	 for	 treatment	
without	violating	the	health	care	professional’s	conscience	(e.g.,	by	transferring	the	
patient	 to	 another	 health	 care	 professional),	 this	 should	 be	 permitted,	 indeed	
facilitated,	 in	 the	 system.	 	 Beyond	 that,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 refusal	 of	 consent	 to	 the	
withholding	or	withdrawal	of	potentially	life‐sustaining	treatment	by	the	patient	or	
patient’s	 sdm,	 unless	 authorised	 to	 withhold	 or	 withdraw	 by	 a	 court,	 the	 doctor	
should	be	compelled,	even	over	a	conscience	claim,	to	provide	treatment.		It	should	
also	be	remembered	that,	in	this	kind	of	case,	the	patient	is	already	in	a	therapeutic	
relationship	 with	 the	 doctor	 and,	 unless	 a	 referral	 to	 another	 health	 care	
professional	is	possible,	it	would	be	contrary	to	professional	ethics	for	the	doctor	to	
cease	treating	the	patient	or	to	treat	the	patient	in	a	way	that	is	contrary	to	stated	
wishes.51	
	
This	 approach	 to	 a	 doctor’s	 conscience	 (i.e.,	 overriding	 it	 in	 some	 circumstances	
when	the	value	of	respecting	it	is	overridden	by	the	harms	of	doing	so),	is	consistent	
with	the	law’s	approach	to	compelling	the	cessation	of	treatment	(even	where	that	
requires	 action	 by	 the	 doctor	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 removing	 ventilatory	 support	 or	
transferring	the	patient	to	a	doctor	who	is	prepared	to	do	so).52		
	
2.9	 Humility		
	
Humility	 arises	 in	 the	 context	 of	 considering	 who	 has	 privileged	 access	 to	 what	
information	 and	 who	 can	 best	 judge	 the	 various	 elements	 in	 the	 decision	 to	
withhold	 or	 withdraw	 treatment.	 	 Advocates	 of	 unilateral	 withholding	 and	
																																																																																																																																																																					
signed	by	New	Zealand	on	12	November	1968	and	ratified	on	28	December	1978);	New	Zealand	Bill	
of	Rights	Act	1990	(NZ),	s	13;	Charter	of	Human	Rights	and	Responsibilities	Act	2006	(Vic),	s	14;	
Human	Rights	Act	2004	(ACT),	s	14.			
50	In	Danny	Sullivan,	‘The	moral	costs	of	health	care’	(1999)	7	Journal	of	Law	and	Medicine	156,	
Sullivan	argues	that	a	health	professional	may	be	justified	in	refusing	to	offer	treatment	on	the	basis	
of	his	or	her	conscientious	objection	to	using	the	resources.	
51	See,	for	example,	the	Australian	Medical	Association,	Code	of	Ethics	(20	November	2006),	16,	18,	
<https://ama.com.au/codeofethics>;	New	Zealand	Medical	Association,	Code	of	Ethics	for	the	New	
Zealand	Medical	Profession,	6,	13,	<http://www.nzma.org.nz/sites/all/files/Code_of_Ethics.pdf>.		
52	Re	B	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[2002]	2	All	ER	449,	475.	
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withdrawal	 cast	 doctors	 as	 having	 the	 requisite	 knowledge	 for	 determinations	 of	
‘appropriate	 treatment’	 and	 ‘best	 interests’.	 	 Opponents	 argue	 that	 patients	
themselves	or	patients’	families	are	better	situated	to	judge	what	is	in	the	patient's	
best	 interests	 or,	 where	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 doubt	 the	 judgment	 of	 the	 patient’s	
families,	 that	 judges	 and	 tribunals	 are	 best	 situated	 to	 make	 the	 substituted	
judgment.	
	
There	 is	 a	 need	 for	 doctors	 to	 be	 humble.	 	 Doctors	 must	 realise	 that	 when	 the	
decision	 is	 at	 least	 partly	 an	 ethical	 one	 (namely,	whether	 the	 treatment	 is	 in	 the	
patient’s	best	interests,	or	is	‘worth	doing’),	they	do	not	have	privileged	access	to	the	
truth.	 	 They	 have	 relevant	 information	 and	 their	 opinions,	 while	 potentially	
illuminating,	should	not	be	determinative.53			
	
This	 should	 drive	 doctors	 to	 support	 a	model	 which	 recognises	 that	 others	 have	
greater	expertise	than	they	do	in	relation	to	what	specific	patients	want	or	what	is	
in	 their	 patients'	 best	 interests	 and,	 reflecting	 that,	 establishes	 others	 as	 the	
appropriate	 decision‐makers.	 	 Such	 decision‐makers	 may	 be	 a	 patient’s	 legally	
authorised	 sdm,	 court,	 tribunal,	 or	 policy‐makers.	 	 Such	 a	 model	 would	 require	
doctors	to	obtain	consent	from	the	patient	or	the	patient’s	legally	authorised	sdm,	or	
authorization	 from	 a	 court	 or	 tribunal	 where	 the	 treatment	 decision	 rests	 on	
whether	 the	 treatment	 is	 in	 the	 patient’s	 best	 interests	 (whether	 seen	 through	 a	
straight	best	interests	approach	or	through	a	futility	lens).	
	
Tribunals,	comprised	of	individuals	with	a	range	of	expertise	(including	with	respect	
to	 clinical	 matters	 as	 well	 as	 disability,	 culture,	 and	 ethics)	 are	 arguably	 better	
situated	than	doctors	to	review	the	complex	medical,	moral	and	social	aspects	of	the	
decisions	at	issue	in	this	paper.		This	conclusion	is	perhaps	reflected	in	the	fact	that,	
in	Australia,	such	matters	are	 increasingly	being	dealt	with	by	tribunals.54	 	Society	
needs	 to	 have	 a	 trusted	 agent	 to	 weigh	 all	 of	 the	 evidence	 and	 make	 the	 best	
judgment	they	can	as	between	the	competing	positions	and	it	has	given	that	job	to	
judges	and	tribunal	members.	
	
																																																								
53	See,	for	example,	S	Moratti,	‘The	development	of	“medical	futility”:	towards	a	procedural	approach	
based	on	the	role	of	the	medical	profession’	(2009)	35	Journal	of	Medical	Ethics	369,	369	where	the	
author	observes	that	futility	judgments	are	based	on	subjective	evaluations	of	quality	of	life.	
54	See,	for	example,	the	following	end‐of‐life	matters	that	have	been	determined	by	tribunals	in	New	
South	Wales,	Queensland	and	Victoria:	New	South	Wales	‐	WK	v	Public	Guardian	(No	2)	[2006]	
NSWADT	121;	BAH	[2007]	NSWGT	1	(this	decision	was	previously	known	as	Re	AG	[2007]	NSWGT	
1);	FI	v	Public	Guardian	[2008]	NSWADT	263;	LE	and	LF	v	Public	Guardian	[2009]	NSWADT	78;	QAN	
[2008]	NSWGT	19;	HH	v	HI	and	Protective	Commissioner	[2009]	NSW	ADTAP	41;	Queensland	‐	Re	
AAC	[2009]	QGAAT	27;	Re	SAJ	[2007]	QGAAT	62;	Re	MHE	[2006]	QGAAT	9;	Re	HG	[2006]	QGAAT	26;	
Re	L	[2005]	QGAAT	13;	Re	MC	[2003]	QGAAT	13;	Re	TM	[2002]	QGAAT	1;	Re	RWG	[2000]	QGAAT	2;	
Re	PVM	[2000]	QGAAT	1;	Victoria	‐	BK	(Guardianship)	[2007]	VCAT	332;	Korp	(Guardianship)	[2005]	
VCAT	779;	AV	(Guardianship)	[2005]	VCAT	2519;	EK	(Guardianship)	[2005]	VCAT	2520;	Public	
Advocate	v	RCS	(Guardianship)	[2004]	VCAT	1880.	
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However,	they	too	must	be	humble.		The	need	for	humility	on	the	part	of	courts	and	
tribunals	has	been	recognised	by	a	court.	 	 In	a	2007	Canadian	case,55	doctors	and	
parents	of	an	eight	month	old	baby	in	a	vegetative	state	disagreed	about	treatment.		
The	doctors	wanted	 assisted	 ventilation	withdrawn	and	 the	parents	did	 not.	 	 The	
matter	 came	 before	 a	 Consent	 and	 Capacity	 Board	 to	 resolve	 the	 impasse.	 	 The	
mother	asked	two	questions	of	the	Panel:	what	authority	the	panel	had	to	make	the	
decision;	and	why	the	Panel	thought	it	was	better	placed	than	she	was	to	do	so.		The	
Panel	responded:	
	
	The	answer	to	the	first	question	was	simple:	s	37	of	the	[Health	Care	Consent	Act]	
authorized	 Dr	 Choong’s	 application	 to	 the	 Board	 and	 required	 us	 to	
adjudicate.		That	was	our	authority.		The	answer	to	the	second	question	was	rather	
more	 difficult,	 in	 part	 because,	 given	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 treatment	 decision	 to	 be	
made,	the	question	and	the	decision	humbled	us.56		
	
3. Overview	of	the	law	
	
It	 is	 not	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 paper	 to	 provide	 an	 exhaustive	 description	 of	 the	
Australian	 and	 New	 Zealand	 law	 about	 a	 doctor’s	 obligation	 to	 provide	 medical	
treatment.		Such	an	analysis	has	been	undertaken	elsewhere.57		However,	in	order	to	
critically	review	the	regime,	both	in	terms	of	a	legal	critique	and	as	against	the	core	
values	we	 argue	 should	 underpin	 a	 legal	 regime,	 a	 brief	 description	 of	 the	 law	 is	
necessary	here.	
	
When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	provision	of	medical	 treatment,	 obligations	 are	 imposed	on	
doctors	by	both	the	criminal	and	civil	law	regimes.		The	criminal	law	imposes	a	duty	
upon	a	person	(in	this	context,	a	doctor)	who	voluntarily	assumes	responsibility	for	
another	who	is	unable	to	care	for	themselves	due	to	mental	or	physical	incapacity.58		
In	 such	a	 case,	 the	doctor	has	 a	duty	 to	provide	 the	other	with	 the	necessaries	of	
life.59		Necessaries	of	life	can	include	medical	treatment,60	so	criminal	sanction	could	
potentially	attach	to	not	providing	treatment.		
																																																								
55	In	the	Matter	of	EJG	(2007)	CanLII	44704	(ON	CCB).	
56	In	the	Matter	of	EJG	(2007)	CanLII	44704	(ON	CCB),	18‐19.	
57	Lindy	Willmott,	Ben	White	and	Jocelyn	Downie,	‘Withholding	and	withdrawal	of	‘futile’	life‐
sustaining	treatment:	Unilateral	medical	decision‐making	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand’	(2013)	20	
Journal	of	Law	and	Medicine	907.	
58	The	Supreme	Court	of	Western	Australia	explored	the	extent	to	which	a	person	would	have	the	
‘care	and	charge	of	a	person’,	the	words	used	in	the	WA	Criminal	Code,	in	Brightwater	Care	Group	v	
Rossiter	(2009)	40	WAR	84.		That	case	involved	a	competent	man	with	quadriplegia	who	wished	to	
stop	receiving	artificial	hydration	and	nutrition.		In	the	context	of	this	case,	the	Supreme	Court	held	
that	the	care	facility	could	not	be	regarded	as	having	the	‘care	and	charge’	of	the	man.		This	aspect	of	
the	duty	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Ben	White,	Lindy	Willmott	and	John	Allen,	‘Withholding	and	
Withdrawing	Life‐Sustaining	Treatment:	Criminal	Responsibility	for	Established	Medical	Practice?’	
(2010)	17	Journal	of	Law	and	Medicine	849.	
59	This	duty	arises	both	in	the	common	law	jurisdictions	(Australian	Capital	Territory,	New	South	
Wales,	South	Australia	and	Victoria):	R	v	Taktak	(1988)	14	NSWLR	226;	and	the	Criminal	Code	
jurisdictions	(Northern	Territory,	Queensland,	Tasmania	and	Western	Australia):	Northern	
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The	civil	law	also	imposes	a	duty	on	doctors	to	use	reasonable	care	and	skill	when	
making	treatment	decisions	 in	relation	to	patients.61	 	This	arises	 in	Australia	 from	
the	 general	 law	 of	 negligence62	 and	 in	 New	 Zealand	 principally	 from	 the	 Code	 of	
Health	 and	 Disability	 Services	 Consumers’	 Rights.63	 	 Where	 medical	 treatment	 is	
needed	 to	 keep	 a	 patient	 alive,	 reasonable	 care	will	 often	dictate	 the	provision	 of	
treatment.	 	 Withholding	 or	 withdrawing	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment	 can	
give	rise	to	a	breach	of	this	civil	duty	if	doing	so	falls	short	of	exercising	reasonable	
care	and	skill.64	
	
The	assessment	of	medical	treatment	as	futile	in	a	given	case	will	alter	the	criminal	
and	 civil	 law	 obligations	 just	mentioned.	 	 The	 courts	 have	 consistently	 held	 that,	
where	treatment	is	assessed	to	be	futile,	a	doctor	is	not	under	a	duty	to	provide	the	
medical	treatment.		There	have	been	two	bases	for	arriving	at	this	conclusion.			
	
The	 first	 is	 that	 futile	 treatment	will	 be	 treatment	 that	 is	not	 in	 the	patient’s	best	
interests.	 	Accordingly,	 if	 the	court	agrees	with	a	doctor’s	assessment	of	 futility,	 it	
will	 not	 interfere	with	 the	 doctor’s	 treatment	 of	 the	 patient	 by	 requiring	 that	 the	
treatment	be	provided.65	
																																																																																																																																																																					
Territory:	Criminal	Code	(NT),	s	149;	Queensland:	Criminal	Code	(Qld),	s	285;	Tasmania:	Criminal	
Code	(Tas),	s	144;	and	Western	Australia:	(Criminal	Code	(WA),	s	262.		An	equivalent	duty	arises	in	
relation	to	children:	in	relation	to	common	law	jurisdictions,	see	R	v	Russell	[1933]	VLR	59	and	R	v	
Clarke	[1959]	VR	645	and	in	the	Code	jurisdictions,	the	duty	applies	to	children	who	are	under	16:	
Northern	Territory:	Criminal	Code	(NT),	s	149;	Queensland:	Criminal	Code	(Qld),	s	286(1)(a);	
Tasmania:	Criminal	Code	(Tas),	s	145;	and	Western	Australia:	Criminal	Code	(WA),	s	263.		The	duty	to	
provide	the	necessaries	of	life	in	New	Zealand	is	contained	in	the	Crimes	Act	1961	(NZ),	ss	151	
(general	duty),	152	(child	under	16	years).	
60	R	v	Macdonald	and	Macdonald	[1904]	St	R	Qd	151;	R	v	Nielsen	[2001]	QCA	85,	[3]	(Williams	JA).	
61	In	addition	to	this	civil	duty	(discussed	next),	another	possible	source	of	legal	duty	could	arise	from	
human	rights	obligations.		To	date,	however,	such	obligations	have	not	been	influential	in	the	
development	of	the	law	in	this	field	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand:	for	more	detail,	see	Lindy	
Willmott,	Ben	White	and	Jocelyn	Downie,	‘Withholding	and	withdrawal	of	‘futile’	life‐sustaining	
treatment:	Unilateral	medical	decision‐making	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand’	(2013)	20	Journal	of	
Law	and	Medicine	907.	
62	Rogers	v	Whitaker	(1992)	175	CLR	479	(although	note	the	various	civil	liability	legislation	which	
has	altered	the	common	law).	
63	Right	4.	See	J	Manning,	‘The	Required	Standard	of	Care	for	Treatment’	in	PGD	Skegg	and	R	Paterson	
(ed),	Medical	Law	in	New	Zealand	(Thomson	Brookers,	2006)	61,	61‐66.	
64	Compare	Hunter	Area	Health	Service	v	Marchlewski	(2000)	51	NSWLR	268	which	considered	the	
duty	of	care	owed	to	the	parents	of	an	infant	who	was	ultimately	the	subject	of	a	non‐treatment	
decision.		See	also	D	Lane	v	Northern	NSW	Local	Health	District;	E	Lane	v	Northern	NSW	Local	Health	
District	[2013]	NSWDC	12.	
65	A	challenge	by	a	family	of	a	doctor’s	assessment	of	futility	will	generally	be	heard	by	a	court	in	its	
parens	patriae	jurisdiction.		Such	a	challenge	was	made	by	the	family,	unsuccessfully,	in	Messiha	v	
South	East	Health	[2004]	NSWSC	1061.		Compare	Northridge	v	Central	Sydney	Area	Health	Service	
(2000)	50	NSWLR	549	where,	on	an	application	brought	by	the	patient’s	sister,	the	Supreme	Court	of	
New	South	Wales	held	that	the	doctor	had	wrongly	withheld	treatment	that	was	appropriate	and	
reasonable.		In	a	similar	vein,	in	Australian	Capital	Territory	v	JT	(2009)	4	ACTLR	68,	the	Australian	
Capital	Territory	which	ran	a	care	facility	in	which	the	patient	resided,	applied	for	a	declaration	that	
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The	 second	 basis	 is	 that	 stopping	 (or	 not	 providing)	 futile	 treatment	 will	 not	
constitute	 a	 breach	of	 the	 criminal	 law	duty	 to	 provide	necessaries	 of	 life.	 	 There	
have	 been	 two	 grounds	 for	 reaching	 this	 conclusion.	 	 	 The	 first	 is	 that	 if	medical	
treatment	 is	futile,	 it	could	not	be	regarded	as	a	necessary	of	 life.	 	 In	a	decision	by	
the	 New	 Zealand	 High	 Court,	 Auckland	 Area	 Health	 Board	 v	 Attorney	 General,66	
Thomas	 J	 concluded	 that	 treatment	was	a	necessary	of	 life	 if	 ‘required	 to	prevent,	
cure,	or	alleviate	a	disease	that	endangers	the	health	or	life	of	a	patient’.67		 	In	that	
case,	the	patient	had	severe	Guillain‐Barre	syndrome	and	there	was	no	prospect	of	
him	improving.		In	these	circumstances,	Thomas	J	found	that	the	artificial	ventilation	
that	was	needed	to	keep	the	patient	alive	was	not	a	necessary	of	life.	
	
The	other	ground	for	escaping	criminal	sanction	was	suggested	by	the	New	Zealand	
High	 Court	 in	 the	 same	 case.	 	 The	 Court	 concluded	 that	 even	 if	 the	 provision	 of	
artificial	 ventilation	was	 a	 necessary	 of	 life,	 contrary	 to	 the	 Court’s	 finding,	 there	
was	 a	 ‘lawful	 excuse’	 for	 not	 providing	 the	 treatment.	 	 The	 lawful	 excuse	 arose	
because	 it	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 ‘good	 medical	 practice’	 not	 to	 provide	 medical	
treatment	in	the	circumstances	of	this	patient.68			In	the	later	decision	of	Shortland	v	
Northland	Health	 Ltd,69	 the	 New	 Zealand	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 further	 considered	 the	
content	of	the	excuse	of	‘good	medical	practice’.		The	patient	here	was	a	63‐year‐old	
man	 with	 a	 long	 history	 of	 type	 II	 diabetes,	 end‐stage	 chronic	 renal	 failure	 and	
dementia.	 	 His	 family	 had	 challenged	 a	 decision	 to	 not	 allow	 him	 into	 the	 renal	
dialysis	program.		
	
The	Court	of	Appeal	held	that	not	providing	the	treatment	the	family	sought	was	not	
a	 breach	 of	 Northland	Health’s	 duty	 to	 provide	 necessaries	 of	 life	 because	 it	was	
done	in	accordance	with	‘good	medical	practice’.		Of	significance	for	our	purposes	is	
the	court’s	consideration	of	one	of	the	elements	of	‘good	medical	practice’	that	was	
set	out	in	Auckland:	 ‘the	fully‐informed	consent	of	the	patient’s	family’.70		Although	
seen	as	a	required	part	of	good	medical	practice	in	Auckland,	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	
Shortland	explicitly	 rejected,	 as	a	general	proposition,	 the	need	 to	obtain	 the	 fully	
informed	consent	of	the	patient’s	family,	saying	only	that	the	‘appropriate	course	is	
to	 expect,	where	 circumstances	permit,	 that	 there	will	 be	 reasonable	 consultation	
with	 the	patient	and	such	members	of	 the	 family	as	are	available.’71	 	The	Court	of	
Appeal	 did	 acknowledge	 in	 dicta,	 however,	 that	 ‘the	 criterion	 may	 have	 been	
																																																																																																																																																																					
it	would	be	lawful	to	not	administer	artificial	nutrition	and	hydration	to	the	patient.		This	application	
was	refused	as	the	treatment	was	not	futile	in	the	circumstances.			
66	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	249.	
67	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney	General	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	249.	
68	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney	General	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	250‐253.	
69	[1998]	1	NZLR	433.		For	a	critique	of	this	case	on	another	ground,	namely	the	failure	of	the	Court	of	
Appeal	to	engage	with	whether	a	decision	could	be	challenged	based	on	the	allocation	of	scarce	
resources	between	patients	in	addition	to	clinical	factors,	see	Joanna	Manning	and	Ron	Paterson,	
‘“Prioritization”:	Rationing	Health	Care	in	New	Zealand’	(2005)	33	Journal	of	Law,	Medicine	and	Ethics	
681.	
70	Shortland	v	Northland	Health	Ltd	[1998]	1	NZLR	433,	442.			
71	Shortland	v	Northland	Health	Ltd	[1998]	1	NZLR	433,	443.	
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appropriate	 in	 the	context	of	 the	proposed	removal	of	a	 life‐support	 system,	as	 in	
the	Auckland	case.’72		
	
In	 summary,	 the	 following	 general	 observations	 can	 be	 made	 about	 the	 law	 in	
Australia	and	New	Zealand	regarding	a	doctor’s	obligation	to	provide	treatment	that	
is	assessed	to	be	futile:73	
	
1. There	is	no	general	duty	on	doctors	to	provide	treatment	that	they	consider	
to	be	futile.74	
2. In	Australia,	doctors	do	not	need	consent	from	the	patient	or	his	or	her	sdm,	
or	other	authorization,	to	withhold	or	withdraw	treatment	that	they	consider	
to	be	futile.	
3. In	New	Zealand,	doctors	do	not	need	consent	from	the	patient	or	his	or	her	
sdm,	or	other	authorization,	 to	withhold	 treatment	 that	 they	consider	 to	be	
futile.	 It	 is	 unclear	 whether	 consent	 or	 other	 authorization	 is	 needed	 to	
withdraw	treatment	already	being	provided.	
4. In	practical	 terms,	 determination	of	 futility	 is	 in	 the	 first	 instance	made	by	
doctors,	but	can	be	challenged	by	a	patient	or	his	or	her	sdm.	
	
3.1		 Statutory	modification	of	the	law	on	futility	in	Queensland	
	
In	 Queensland,	 the	 law	 described	 above	 has	 been	 modified	 by	 legislation	 if	 the	
patient	 is	 an	 adult	 who	 lacks	 decision‐making	 capacity.	 	 In	 that	 jurisdiction,	 the	
guardianship	legislation	requires	consent	to	be	obtained	from	a	sdm	(or	some	other	
authority)	before	a	doctor	can	withhold	or	withdraw	futile	treatment.75		Therefore,	
doctors	are	not	permitted	 to	unilaterally	withdraw	or	withhold	medical	 treatment	
without	consent	for	treatment	they	assess	to	be	futile.		There	has	been	a	suggestion	
																																																								
72	Shortland	v	Northland	Health	Ltd	[1998]	1	NZLR	433,	443.	
73	This	conclusion	draws	on	the	analysis	of	Lindy	Willmott,	Ben	White	and	Jocelyn	Downie,	
‘Withholding	and	withdrawal	of	‘futile’	life‐sustaining	treatment:	Unilateral	medical	decision‐making	
in	Australia	and	New	Zealand’	(2013)	20	Journal	of	Law	and	Medicine	907.	
74	While	the	cases	that	have	considered	this	issue	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand	relate	to	incompetent	
patients,	a	similar	approach	is	likely	to	be	taken	for	competent	patients:	see	R	(on	the	application	of	
Burke)	v	The	General	Medical	Council	[2006]	QB	273,	301‐302	where	the	English	Court	of	Appeal	
concluded	that	patients	could	not	demand	treatment	if	the	doctors	formed	the	view	that	it	was	‘not	
clinically	indicated’.	
75	Section	79	of	the	Guardianship	and	Administration	Act	2000	(GAA)	makes	it	an	offence	for	a	health	
provider	to	carry	out	‘health	care’	for	an	adult	with	impaired	capacity	unless	the	appropriate	consent	
(or	some	other	authorisation)	is	obtained.	‘Health	care’	is	defined	in	Schedule	2,	s	5(2)	to	include	
withholding	and	withdrawal	of	a	life‐sustaining	measure	if	the	commencement	or	continuation	of	the	
measure	would	be	inconsistent	with	good	medical	practice.	This	means	that	a	potentially	life‐
sustaining	measure	that	is	considered	futile	would	fall	within	that	definition.		For	more	detail	on	the	
Queensland	legislation	in	this	field,	see	Ben	White	and	Lindy	Willmott,	Rethinking	Life‐Sustaining	
Measures:	Questions	for	Queensland	(QUT	Printing	Services,	Brisbane,	2005)	69‐72,	
<http://eprints.qut.edu.au/7093/>;	Lindy	Willmott,	Ben	White	and	Shih‐Ning	Then,	‘Withholding	
and	Withdrawing	Life‐Sustaining	Medical	Treatment’	in	Ben	White,	Fiona	McDonald	and	Lindy	
Willmott	(eds),	Health	Law	in	Australia	(Thomson	Reuters,	2010)	[13.240].			
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that	 legislation	 in	South	Australia	and	Western	Australia	has	a	 similar	 effect76	but	
for	reasons	explained	elsewhere,	we	believe	this	is	not	the	case.77		
	
	
4. Critique	of	the	current	law	in	light	of	the	core	values	
	
Against	this	backdrop	of	core	values	and	balancing	of	values	and	a	description	of	the	
current	 law,	 we	 now	 turn	 to	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 issue	 of	
unilateral	withholding	 and	withdrawal	 of	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment	 has	
been	dealt	with	under	Australian	and	New	Zealand	law.			
	
Before	we	commence	the	critique	of	the	current	law	in	light	of	the	core	values,	we	
note	that	there	are	some	values	that	the	current	law	promotes.		The	first	is	the	value	
of	 life	 (value	 2.1).	 	 The	 duty	 to	 provide	 treatment	 that	 is	 in	 the	 patient’s	 best	
interests,	 and	 the	 requirement	 to	 provide	 a	 person	 with	 the	 necessaries	 of	 life	
underscores	 the	 value	 that	 the	 law	places	 on	 life.	 	Nevertheless,	 the	 common	 law	
world	also	recognises	that	the	value	of	life	is	not	absolute.	 	The	law	recognises	the	
right	 of	 a	 competent	 individual	 to	 refuse	 treatment	 that	 is	 required	 to	 keep	 that	
person	 alive.78	 	 That	 refusal	 may	 be	 either	 contemporaneous79	 or	 in	 advance	 of	
losing	capacity.80		It	also	recognises	that	for	a	person	who	has	lost	capacity,	in	some	
cases,	 continuing	 to	 provide	 treatment	 is	 not	 in	 that	 person’s	 ‘best	 interests’,	
although	treatment	may	be	necessary	to	keep	him	or	her	alive.81	 	In	determining	a	
																																																								
76	Cameron	L	Stewart,	‘A	defence	of	the	requirement	to	seek	consent	to	withhold	and	withdraw	futile	
treatments’	(2012)	196	Medical	Journal	of	Australia	406.		See	also	Sean	Lawrence	et	al,	‘Autonomy	
versus	futility?	Barriers	to	good	clinical	practice	in	end‐of‐life	care:	a	Queensland	case’	(2012)	196	
Medical	Journal	of	Australia	404.	Skene	recognises	that	s	17(2)	of	the	Consent	to	Medical	Treatment	
and	Palliative	Care	Act	1995	(SA)	could	be	interpreted	in	this	way,	but	also	that	there	are	sufficient	
grounds	for	courts	to	interpret	the	provision	consistently	with	the	common	law:	Loane	Skene,	
‘Withholding	and	Withdrawing	Treatment	in	South	Australia	when	Patients,	Parents	or	Guardians	
Insist	that	Treatment	Must	Be	Continues’	(2003)	24	Adelaide	Law	Review	161.	Note	finally	that	
section	17(2)	of	the	Consent	to	Medical	Treatment	and	Palliative	Care	Act	1995	(SA)	will	be	amended	
and	replaced	by	Schedule	1,	section	11	of	the	Advance	Care	Directives	Act	2013	(SA)	to	put	this	matter	
beyond	doubt.		
77	Lindy	Willmott,	Ben	White	and	Jocelyn	Downie,	‘Withholding	and	withdrawal	of	‘futile’	life‐
sustaining	treatment:	Unilaterial	medical	decision‐making	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand’	(2013)	20	
Journal	of	Law	and	Medicine	907.	
78	Brightwater	Care	Group	v	Rossiter	(2009)	40	WAR	84;	R	(On	the	Application	of	Burke)	v	The	General	
Medical	Council	[2006]	QB	273;	Re	B	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[2002]	2	All	ER	449;	Re	C	
(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1994]	1	All	ER	819;	Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	AC	789;	
Re	T	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1992]	4	All	ER	649.	
79	Brightwater	Care	Group	v	Rossiter	(2009)	40	WAR	84;	Re	B	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	
[2002]	2	All	ER	449;	Re	C	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1994]	1	All	ER	819.	
80	Hunter	and	New	England	Area	Health	Service	v	A	(2009)	74	NSWLR	88;	HE	v	A	Hospital	NHS	Trust	
[2003]	2	FLR	408;	Re	C	[1994]	1	All	ER	819;	Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	AC	789,	864	(Lord	
Goff),	892	(Lord	Mustill);	Re	T	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1992]	4	All	ER	649,	653	(Lord	
Donaldson	MR),	662–3	(Lord	Donaldson	MR),	665–6	(Butler‐Sloss	P),	669	(Staughton	J);	Malette	v	
Shulman	(1990)	67	DLR	(4th)	321.	
81	See,	for	example,	the	following	cases	where	treatment	which	was	regarded	as	futile	was	considered	
not	to	be	in	the	patient’s	best	interests:	Melo	v	Superintendent	of	Royal	Darwin	Hospital	(2007)	21	
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person’s	best	interests,	the	law	will	consider	the	burdens	of	treatment	as	well	as	the	
benefits.82	
	
The	 second	 value	 that	 the	 current	 law	 promotes,	 at	 least	 in	 Australia,	 is	 the	
(comparatively)	 efficient	 and	 cost	 effective	 framework	 for	 resolving	 disputes	 that	
may	 arise	 between	 doctors	 and	 family	 (relevant	 to	 value	 2.7).	 	 Although	 the	
Supreme	 Court	 in	 all	 Australian	 jurisdictions	 retains	 jurisdiction	 to	 determine	
disputes	 that	 may	 arise	 regarding	 treatment	 (and	 the	 Family	 Court	 can	 have	
jurisdiction	 for	 disagreements	 involving	 children),	 these	 disputes	 are	 increasingly	
being	decided	by	tribunals	and	boards	pursuant	to	guardianship	legislation.83	 	The	
guardianship	system	is	expressly	designed	to	resolve	matters	 in	a	timely,	 informal	
and	inexpensive	fashion.84				
	
Despite	 promoting	 these	 two	 values,	 the	 authors	 contend	 that	 there	 are	 many	
important	 values,	 articulated	 in	 the	 second	 section	 of	 this	 article,	 that	 are	 not	
promoted	 by	 the	 existing	 law	 in	 Australia	 and	New	 Zealand.	 	 The	 balance	 of	 this	
section	critiques	the	current	law	with	respect	to	the	withholding	and	withdrawal	of	
potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment	 against	 those	 values.	 	 We	 have	 grouped	 the	
concerns	with	the	current	approach	into	five	categories:	uncertainty	problems	that	
arise	 from	 the	 underdeveloped	 jurisprudence	 and	 lack	 of	 legislation	 in	 the	 area;	
conceptual	problems	associated	with	the	use	of	the	terms	‘futility’	and	‘necessaries	
of	life’;	role	problems	associated	with	the	roles	ascribed	to	medicine	and	to	doctors;	
onus	problems	with	respect	to	invoking	dispute	resolution	processes,	and	how	the	
law	 in	 this	 field	should	develop;	and	the	covert	nature	of	 the	process	of	allocating	
health	resources.	
	
4.1	 Uncertainty,	complexity,	and	inconsistency	problems	
	
																																																																																																																																																																					
NTLR	197;	In	the	matter	of	Herrington;	Re	King	[2007]	VSC	151;	Messiha	v	South	East	Health	[2004]	
NSWSC	1061;	Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	AC	789.		
82	See,	for	example,	Messiha	v	South	East	Health	[2004]	NSWSC	1061,	[22],	[23],	[28];	In	the	matter	of	
Herrington;	Re	King	[2007]	VSC	151,	[14].		In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	courts	will	balance	the	benefits	
and	burdens	in	a	balance	sheet	approach:	see,	for	example,	W	v	M,	S	and	A	NHS	Primary	Care	Trust	
[2011]	EWHC	2443	(Fam);	NHS	Trust	v	Ms	D	[2006]	1	FLR	638.			
83	Australian	jurisdictions	have	statutory	regimes	that	provide	for	substituted	decision‐making	on	
behalf	of	adults	who	do	not	have	decision‐making	capacity:	Guardianship	and	Management	of	
Property	Act	1991	(ACT);	Guardianship	Act	1987	(NSW);	Adult	Guardianship	Act	(NT);	Guardianship	
and	Administration	Act	2000	(Qld);	Guardianship	and	Administration	Act	1995	(Tas);	Guardianship	
and	Administration	Act	1993	(SA);	Guardianship	and	Administration	Act	1986	(Vic);	Guardianship	and	
Administration	Act	1990	(WA).	These	statutory	regimes	include	mechanisms	for	resolving	disputes	
that	can	arise.	New	Zealand	has	not	yet	established	guardianship	tribunals.		
84	Adrian	F	Ashman	and	Ron	Joachim,	‘Consumer	satisfaction:	Case	study	from	an	Australian	
guardianship	jurisdiction’	(2010)	18	Australian	Journal	of	Administrative	Law	20,	20;	Victorian	Law	
Reform	Commission,	Guardianship	Final	Report,	Report	No	24	(2012)	468;	Queensland	Law	Reform	
Commission,	‘Assisted	and	substituted	decisions:	Decision‐making	by	and	for	people	with	a	decision‐
making	disability’,	Report	49	(1996),	27.		See	also	note	46	above.	
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As	observed	in	section	2.4,	the	rule	of	law	requires	that	law	must	be	capable	of	being	
ascertained.	 	This	 is	not	possible	when	 law	is	uncertain	and	cannot	be	confidently	
stated.		Efforts	to	ascertain	the	law	can	be	further	frustrated	where	it	is	complex	and	
inconsistent.		The	current	law	suffers	from	all	of	these	problems.	
	
4.1.1	 Uncertainty	
	
In	the	previous	section,	we	set	out	some	‘general	observations’	about	the	law.		From	
even	 that	 brief	 examination	 of	 the	 law,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 it	 was	 not	 possible	 to	
provide	 unequivocal	 statements	 because	 there	 continues	 to	 be	 some	 uncertainty	
with	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	 law	 in	 this	 field.	 	 The	 obvious	 example	 is	 that	 in	 New	
Zealand,	 it	 is	 unclear	 whether	 family	 consent	 is	 a	 necessary	 criterion	 for	 good	
medical	 practice,	 and	 thereby	 for	 lawfulness,	 for	 withdrawing	 treatment	 that	
doctors	 consider	 to	 be	 futile.	 	 As	 noted	 above,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 in	Shortland	 v	
Northland	 Health	 Ltd85	 found	 that	 fully‐informed	 family	 consent	 ‘may	 have	 been	
appropriate	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 proposed	 removal	 of	 a	 life‐support	 system’.86		
Obviously,	 this	 point	 is	 central	 to	 the	 lawfulness	 of	 unilateral	 withholding	 and	
withdrawal.		
	
Another	example,	which	was	not	discussed	above,	is	a	more	technical	legal	issue	of	
uncertainty.		As	we	have	seen,	there	is	case	authority	in	New	Zealand	that	a	doctor	
may	have	a	legal	excuse	for	not	providing	treatment,	even	contrary	to	family	wishes,	
where	 such	 a	 course	 represents	 good	 medical	 practice.	 	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	
whether	 compliance	 with	 good	 medical	 practice	 will	 be	 recognised	 as	 a	 lawful	
excuse	 in	 Australian	 jurisdictions,	 particularly	 where	 the	 criminal	 law	 has	 been	
codified.		In	Code	states,	it	would	be	unusual	to	recognise	a	lawful	excuse	that	does	
not	arise	from	the	terms	of	the	Code	or	another	piece	of	legislation.87	
	
Uncertainty	 is	not	 surprising	 given	 that	 so	much	of	 the	 law	 in	 this	 area	has	 come	
from	the	courts	rather	than	the	legislatures.		Part	of	the	uncertainty	comes	from	the	
narrowness	 of	 the	 judicial	 function	 which	 is	 focused	 on	 resolving	 the	 particular	
dispute	before	the	court.		This	narrowness	leads	to	uncertainty	because	health	care	
professionals,	patients,	and	sdms	do	not	know	what	to	do	when	the	cases	the	court	
has	decided	are	not	directly	on	point	to	the	case	they	are	considering.		Justice	Munby	
in	 R	 (on	 the	 application	 of	 Burke)	 v	 The	 General	Medical	 Council88	 in	 the	 United	
Kingdom	responded	 to	 this	problem	by	going	well	beyond	 the	 facts	of	 the	 case	 in	
front	of	him	to	try	and	resolve	some	of	the	broader	issues	relating	to	decisions	about	
non‐treatment.		However,	he	was	rebuked	by	the	Court	of	Appeal	for	doing	so.89		
	
																																																								
85	[1998]	1	NZLR	433.	
86	[1998]	1	NZLR	433,	443.	
87	Ben	White,	Lindy	Willmott	and	John	Allen,	‘Withholding	and	Withdrawing	Life‐Sustaining	
Treatment:	Criminal	Responsibility	for	Established	Medical	Practice?’	(2010)	17	Journal	of	Law	and	
Medicine	849,	862.	
88	[2005]	QB	424.	
89	R	(Burke)	v	General	Medical	Council	[2006]	QB	273,	293.	
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This	 aspect	 of	 the	 uncertainty	 problem	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 legislative	 reform	 (our	
preferred	approach),	as	proposed	in	section	5,	where	parliament	must	consider	the	
social,	economic,	legal	and	ethical	contexts	in	formulating	a	legislative	response.	
	
4.1.2	 Complexity	and	inconsistency	
	
The	 statement	 of	 the	 law	 in	 section	 3	 also	 reveals	 both	 complexity	 and	
inconsistency.	 	For	example,	different	 legal	bases	have	been	used	for	 justifying	the	
position	 that	 doctors	 are	 not	 obliged	 to	 provide	 treatment	 that	 is	 futile:	 	 such	
treatment	 is	 not	 in	 a	 patient’s	 best	 interests;	 or	 criminal	 liability	 does	 not	 attach	
because	 either	 futile	 treatment	 is	 not	 a	 necessary	 of	 life,	 or	 the	 non‐provision	
represents	good	medical	practice	and	is	therefore	lawful.			
	
Further,	 in	 one	 jurisdiction	 (Queensland),	 the	 law	 is	 inconsistent	 as	 to	 when	
unilateral	 withholding	 or	 withdrawal	 of	 treatment	 may	 occur.	 	 Doctors	 may	
unilaterally	withhold	or	withdraw	under	the	common	law	for	adults	with	capacity	
and	for	children,	but	the	guardianship	legislation	of	that	State	means	that	consent	is	
required	 when	 the	 decision	 relates	 to	 futile	 treatment	 for	 an	 adult	 who	 lacks	
capacity.90			
	
Such	 complexities	 have	 arisen	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 common	 law	
through	the	difficult	and	urgent	cases	(a	famously	bad	method	for	making	law),	as	
well	 as	 through	 the	 interaction	 of	 the	 common	 law	 with	 legislation	 that	 had	 not	
specifically	 contemplated	 issues	 of	 futile	 treatment.	 	 As	 noted	 above,	 the	
development	of	a	legislative	model	(again,	our	preferred	approach)	to	address	this	
specific	issue	would	avoid	these	difficulties.	
	
4.2	 Conceptual	problems		
	
Our	concerns	about	the	current	legal	framework	are	not	limited	to	the	uncertainty,	
complexity	 and	 inconsistency	 outlined	 above.	 	 Again	 as	 noted	 in	 section	 2.4,	 the	
framework	 is	 underpinned	 by	 concepts	 about	 which	 there	 is	 either	 confusion	 or	
disagreement,	or	which	are	incompatible	with	common	sense	usage	of	language.	
	
4.2.1	 Futility		
	
As	we	have	seen,	assessing	medical	treatment	to	be	futile	carries	with	it	significant	
legal	consequences.91		Yet	individuals	have	different	understandings	of	what	is	futile	
treatment,	and	this	has	proved	to	be	a	barrier	to	reaching	consensus	on	the	meaning	
of	the	term.	 	This	confusion	is	also	reflected	in	the	terminology	used	by	the	judges	
when	determining	disputes	that	arise.		
	
																																																								
90	See	above	at	3.1.	
91	See	section	3	above.	
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The	academic	literature	
	
There	are	dozens	of	definitions	that	have	been	promoted	in	the	academic	literature	
from	 ‘simply	 won’t	 work’	 (antibiotics	 simply	 cannot	 affect	 a	 virus)	 to	 not	 ‘worth	
doing’	 where	 ‘worth	 doing’	 is	 defined	 by	 such	 measures	 as	 varying	 lengths	 of	
survival,	 levels	 of	 quality	 of	 life,	 or	 likely	 chance	 of	 success	 of	 the	 intervention.92		
Normally	we	take	the	position	that	we	should	wrestle	definitional	challenges,	posit	
and	 defend	 a	 definition,	 and	 move	 on.	 	 However,	 here,	 we	 do	 not	 do	 so.	 	 The	
definitional	fight	has	been	going	on	for	more	than	20	years	and	is	still	not	resolved	
and	we	do	not	think	we	lose	anything	important	by	abandoning	that	fight.		Instead,	
we	 think	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 the	distinction	between	 futile(will	 not	 work)	 and	
futile(not	worth	doing).93		In	the	former	case,	doctors	alone	have	the	expertise	regarding	
whether	 treatment	 simply	 won’t	 work.	 	 They	 should	 remain	 the	 gatekeepers	 to	
ensure	such	treatment	is	not	given	to	the	patient.		As	there	will	never	be	consensus	
about	whether	 the	 treatment	 is	 futile(not	 worth	 doing),	we	 should	 cease	 fighting	 about	
whether	futile	treatment	means	treatment	that	will	not	lead	to	ten	minutes	survival,	
sixty	days,	discharge	from	hospital,	a	specific	level	of	quality	of	life,	or	a	percentage	
chance	of	success.			Instead,	we	can	more	constructively	discuss	under	what,	if	any,	
conditions	 doctors	 should	 have	 the	 authority	 to	withhold	 or	withdraw	 treatment	
without	consent	or	authorization	from	anyone	or	anything	else,	be	it	patient,	family,	
guardian,	 court,	 or	 tribunal,	 or	 without	 operation	 of	 a	 statute	 or	 justifiable	
government	or	institutional	policy.	
	
Variance	in	the	case	law	
	
The	 inability	 to	 agree	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 futility	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 academic	
commentary.		In	a	recent	English	case,	the	Court	of	Appeal	expressly	acknowledged	
that	 judgments	 about	 a	 person’s	 quality	 of	 life	 are	 implicit	 in	 any	 assessment	 of	
																																																								
92	See,	for	example,	Lawrence	J	Schneiderman,	Nancy	S	Jecker	and	Albert	R	Jonsen,	‘Medical	Futility:	
Its	Meaning	and	Ethical	Implications’	(1990)	112(12)	Annals	of	Internal	Medicine	949;	Nancy	S	Jecker	
and	Lawrence	J	Schneiderman,	‘Medical	Futility:	The	Duty	Not	to	Treat’	(1993)	2	Cambridge	
Quarterly	of	Healthcare	Ethics	151;	Baruch	A	Brody	and	Amir	Halevy,	‘Is	Futility	a	Futile	Concept?’	
(1995)	20	Journal	of	Medicine	and	Philosophy	123;	Lawrence	J	Schneiderman,	Nancy	S	Jecker	and	
Albert	R	Jonsen,	‘Medical	Futility:	Response	to	Critics’	(1996)	125(8)	Annals	of	Internal	Medicine	669;	
Raanan	Gillon,	‘“Futility”	–	Too	Ambiguous	and	Pejorative	a	Term?’	(1997)	23	Journal	of	Medical	
Ethics	339;	Paul	R	Helft,	Mark	Siegler	and	John	Lantos,	‘The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Futility	Movement’	
(2000)	343.4	The	New	England	Journal	of	Medicine	293;	Deborah	L	Kasman,	‘When	is	Medical	
Treatment	Futile?’	(2004)	19	Journal	of	General	Internal	Medicine	1053;	RK	Mohindra,	‘Medical	
futility:	a	conceptual	model’	(2007)	33	Journal	of	Medical	Ethics	71;	S	Moratti,	‘The	development	of	
“medical	futility”:	towards	a	procedural	approach	based	on	the	role	of	the	medical	profession’	(2009)	
35	Journal	of	Medical	Ethics	369;	Ezra	Gabbay,et	al,	‘The	Empirical	Basis	for	Determinations	of	
Medical	Futility’	(2010)	25(10)	J	Gen	Intern	Med	1083;	DJC	Wilkinson	and	J	Savulescu,	‘Knowing	
when	to	stop:	futility	in	the	ICU	(2011)	24	Current	Opinion	in	Anaesthesiology	160;	Lawrence	J	
Schneiderman,	‘Defining	Medical	Futility	and	Improving	Medical	Care’	(2011)	8	Bioethical	Enquiry	
123.	
93	For	an	analysis	of	the	ethical	distinction	between	‘futile(will	not	work)	treatment’	and	‘futile(not	worth	doing)	
treatment’,	see	Francoise	Baylis,	‘Expert	Testimony	by	Persons	Trained	in	Ethical	Reasoning:	The	
Case	of	Andrew	Sawatzky’	(2008)	28	Journal	of	Law,	Medicine	and	Ethics	224.	
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futility.94	Sir	Alan	Ward	observed	that	‘[l]ike	it	or	not	within	the	question	or	perhaps	
behind	it	is	the	ethically	controversial	question:	is	it	worthwhile	keeping	this	patient	
alive?’95		Different	definitions	of	futile,	either	explicit	or	inferred,	can	be	drawn	from	
various	cases.96			
	
It	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 courts	would	 not	 be	 clear	 on	 this	 concept.	 	 As	 noted	
earlier,	it	is	the	subject	of	extraordinary	debate	within	the	academic	literature,	and	
there	are	countless	definitions	in	that	literature.97			But	contributing	to	the	confusion	
is	 indefensible.	 	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 as	 the	 concept	 of	 futility	 is	 critical	 in	 the	
medico‐legal	context	in	that	the	legal	duty	to	provide	treatment	currently	turns	on	
whether	 the	 treatment	 is	 futile.	 	 As	 such,	 it	 certainly	 deserves	 more	 careful	 and	
consistent	articulation	in	the	case	law.	
	
The	inability	of	lawmakers,	here	the	judiciary,	to	reach	consensus	about	the	scope	of	
this	term	offends	value	2.4	(Rule	of	law).		If	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	whether	a	
particular	treatment	is	futile,	there	will	be	uncertainty	about	a	doctor’s	obligation	to	
provide	that	treatment.	
	
	
4.2.2	 Necessaries	of	life		
	
The	term	‘necessaries	of	 life’	 is	a	significant	one	in	the	legal	context.	 	As	described	
earlier,	a	doctor	may	have	a	duty	to	provide	a	patient	with	‘necessaries	of	life,’	and	a	
failure	to	provide	treatment	may	result	in	a	breach	of	that	duty,	potentially	exposing	
the	 doctor	 to	 criminal	 sanction.	 	 Yet	 ‘necessaries	 of	 life’	 seems	 to	 have	 an	
unspecified	scope,	with	the	meaning	ascribed	to	it	varying	according	to	the	medical	
context.			
	
We	would	argue	that	the	meaning	of	‘necessaries	of	life’	should	not	be	contorted	for	
the	 law	 to	 achieve	 a	 result,	 namely	 allowing	 doctors	 unilaterally	 not	 to	 provide	
																																																								
94	Aintree	University	Hospitals	NHS	Foundation	Trust	v	David	James	[2013]	EWCA	Civ	65,	[36].	
95	Aintree	University	Hospitals	NHS	Foundation	Trust	v	David	James	[2013]	EWCA	Civ	65,	[36].	
96	See,	for	example,	the	different	formulations	in	Re	BWV	[2003]	VCAT	121,	21	(citing	from	the	
judgment	of	Lord	Goff	in	Airedale	National	Health	Service	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	AC	789,	869),	24‐5,	29;	
Messiha	v	South	East	Health	[2004]	NSWSC	1061,	[28];	Application	of	Justice	Health;	re	a	Patient	
[2011]	NSWSC	432,	[2];	BAH	[2007]	NSWGT	1,	[62]	citing	from	the	judgment	of	Howie	J	in	Messiha	v	
South	East	Health	[2004]	NSWSC	1061,	[26].	
97	See,	for	example,	some	definitions	from	the	literature	listed	by	Susan	B.	Rubin,	When	Doctors	Say	
No:	The	Battleground	of	Medical	Futility	(Indiana	University	Press,	1998),	47:	‘Treatments	have	
variously	been	described	as	futile	if	they	cannot	achieve	the	goals	of:	postponing	death;	prolonging	or	
extending	life;	improving,	maintaining,	or	restoring	quality	of	life;	benefiting	the	patient;	benefiting	
the	patient	as	a	whole;	improving	prognosis;	improving	the	patient’s	comfort,	well	being,	or	general	
state	of	health;	reversing	or	ameliorating	an	underlying	condition;	achieving	immediate	objectives;	
achieving	intended	physiologic	effects;	restoring	consciousness;	ending	dependence	on	intensive	
medical	care;	preventing	or	curing	disease;	alleviating	suffering;	relieving	symptoms;	restoring	
function;	discharging	the	patient	to	home;	achieving	short	or	long	term	survival;	achieving	the	
patient’s	goals;	or	achieving	any	of	these	goals.’		See	also	the	literature	referred	to	in	note	92	above.	
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treatment.	 	 Our	 perception	 is	 that	 judges	 have	 wanted	 to	 be	 able	 to	 say	 that	
unilateral	withholding	or	withdrawing	 treatment	 is	not	unlawful,	but	have	 run	up	
against	 the	 provisions	 imposing	 duties	 to	 others	 as	 a	 potential	 barrier	 to	 such	 a	
result.	 	 To	 circumvent	 this	 barrier,	 ‘necessaries	 of	 life’	 has	 been	 defined	 so	 as	 to	
allow	 the	withholding	or	withdrawal	of	 treatment	 that	doctors	 (and	often	doctors	
and	 family)	 would	 agree	 to.	 	 But,	 in	 doing	 the	 work	 through	 the	 definition	 of	
‘necessaries	 of	 life’,	 common	 sense	 has	 been	 left	 behind.	 	 Some	 have	 ended	 up	
calling	treatment	that	a	number	of	people	would	want	and	be	supported	in	wanting,	
such	as	ventilatory	support,	not	a	‘necessary	of	life.‘		
	
The	case	law	demonstrates	the	difficulties	that	this	contorted	or	contrived	definition	
of	 ‘necessaries	 of	 life’	 can	 lead	 to.	 	 The	 court	 in	 Auckland	 Area	 Health	 Board	 v	
Attorney‐General98	 got	 tangled	 up	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘necessaries	 of	 life.’	 	 Justice	
Thomas	stated	that	artificial	respiration	is	a	‘necessary	of	life’	if	‘required	to	prevent,	
cure,	 or	 alleviate	 a	 disease	 that	 endangers	 the	 health	 or	 life	 of	 the	 patient’;99	 and	
treatment	is	not	a	‘necessary	of	life’	if:	
	
 ‘the	 patient	 is	 surviving	 only	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 mechanical	 means	 which	
induces	heartbeat	and	breathing	and	is	beyond	recovery’;100		
	
 it	is	‘serving	no	other	purpose	than	deferring	certain	death’;101	or	
	
 it	 cannot	 ‘intervene	 to	 repel	 the	 disease’	 and	 ‘[w]ithout	 the	 life‐support	
system	death	is	unavoidable’.102	
	
Most	worryingly,	on	Justice	Thomas’	view	of	‘necessaries	of	life,’	the	following	would	
not	be	a	necessary	of	 life:	artificial	ventilation	supplied	 to	a	woman	with	Guillain‐
Barre	disease	or	post‐polio	 syndrome	who	 requires	 the	 ventilator	 to	 live,	will	 not	
have	her	disease	or	syndrome	cured	by	the	ventilation,	will	never	recover	from	her	
illness,	but	who	wishes	to	live	and,	with	the	help	of	the	ventilator,	could	live	a	happy	
and	fulfilling	life	for	ten	years.103	
																																																								
98	[1993]	1	NZLR	235.	
99	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	249.	
100	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	249–250.	
101	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	250.	
102	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	250.		The	phrase	‘necessaries	of	life’	was	also	considered	by	the	Queensland	
Guardianship	and	Administration	Tribunal	(as	it	then	was)	in	Re	RWG	[2000]	QGAAT	2.		The	Tribunal	
[at	57]	relied	heavily	on	the	views	expressed	in	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney‐General	
[1993]	1	NZLR	235	and	cited	from	Thomas	J’s	observation	[at	250]	that	‘[i]f	...	the	patient	is	surviving	
only	by	virtue	of	mechanical	means	which	induces	heartbeat	and	breathing	and	is	beyond	recovery,	I	
do	not	consider	that	the	provision	of	a	ventilator	can	properly	be	construed	as	a	necessary	of	life’.		
The	Tribunal	[at	67]	concluded	that	‘a	doctor	is	under	no	duty	to	provide	medical	treatment	which	is	
of	no	benefit	to	the	patient	and	would	not	be	in	the	patients	[sic]	best	interests.’		For	a	general	
discussion	by	the	Tribunal	of	‘necessaries	of	life’,	see	[56]‐[67].	
103	Justice	Thomas	recognized	the	problem	with	this	distinction	in	the	context	of	his	discussion	of	
‘cause	of	death’	when	withholding	or	withdrawing	treatment	(Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	
Attorney‐General	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	248‐9).		However,	he	did	not	recognize	it	when	he	discussed	
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In	the	context	of	designing	a	more	coherent	model	to	govern	disputes	regarding	end	
of	life	treatment,	we	would	advocate	taking	a	literal	approach	to	necessaries	of	life	–	
that	which	is	required	in	order	to	prevent	death.		Thus,	treatment	that	will	not	work	
is	not	a	‘necessary	of	life.’		It	makes	no	sense	to	speak	of	antibiotics	for	a	virus	as	a	
‘necessary	of	 life.’	 	They	will	do	nothing	for	a	virus.	 	 It	makes	no	sense	to	speak	of	
cardiopulmonary	resuscitation	when	the	patient	has	16	bullet	holes	in	her	heart	as	a	
‘necessary	of	life.’		It	simply	cannot	get	the	heart	restarted.	
	
However,	treatment	that	might	work	(but	might	not	be	worth	doing)	is	a	‘necessary	
of	 life.’	 	 It	 makes	 no	 sense	 to	 speak	 of	 artificial	 nutrition	 and	 hydration	 as	 not	 a	
‘necessary	 of	 life’	 where,	 but	 for	 its	 discontinuation,	 a	 patient	 in	 a	 persistent	
vegetative	state	might	live	for	five	years.		It	makes	no	sense	to	speak	of	an	artificial	
ventilator	 as	 not	 a	 ‘necessary	 of	 life’	 where,	 but	 for	 its	 discontinuation,	 a	 patient	
with	Guillain‐Barre	disease	might	live	for	ten	years.		Each	of	these	treatments	might	
not	 be	 considered	 necessary	 for	 a	 life	worth	 living	 (especially	 to	 the	 patient)	 but	
they	 are	 clearly	 necessary	 for	 life.	 	 And	 the	 expression	 in	 the	 criminal	 law	 is	
‘necessaries	of	life’	not	‘necessaries	of	a	life	longer	than	60	days’	or	‘necessaries	of	a	
life	of	a	certain	quality’,	or	‘necessaries	of	life	with	some	other	qualitative	limitation.’	
	
Whether	 treatment	 that	 might	 work,	 i.e.,	 ‘necessaries	 of	 life,’	 can	 lawfully	 be	
withheld	or	withdrawn	should	be	a	separate	matter	that	we	will	come	back	to	later	
in	this	paper.	
	
The	contorted	and	contrived	interpretation	of	the	term	‘necessaries	of	life’	in	some	
cases	offends	value	2.4	(Rule	of	law).	
	
4.3	 Role	problems		
	
This	 category	 of	 concerns	 relates	 to	 the	 role	 and	 purpose	 of	 medical	 science	
generally,	and	the	influence	and	power	of	doctors	 including	a	perception	that	they	
are	the	appropriate	arbiters	of	futility.		Our	concerns	are	explained	below.	
	
4.3.1	 Role	of	medicine	
	
One	 of	 the	 problems	 with	 the	 current	 legal	 framework	 is	 the	 role	 ascribed	 to	
medicine:	the	issues	are	rendered	entirely	clinical.	
	
As	 we	 have	 touched	 on	 already,	 a	 decision	 about	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 provide	
treatment	 should	 involve	more	 than	 a	 consideration	of	 clinical	 issues.	 	 Yet,	 under	
our	current	system,	the	doctors	are	the	decision‐makers,	a	position	which	suggests	
																																																																																																																																																																					
the	term	‘necessaries	of	life’	(Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney‐General	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	
249‐50).		See	also	PDG	Skegg	“Omissions	to	provide	life‐prolonging	treatment”	(1994)	8	Otago	Law	
Review	205	for	further	critical	analysis	of	Justice	Thomas’	decision	with	respect	to	‘necessaries	of	
life’.	
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that	 the	 decision	 is	 indeed	 a	 clinical	 one.	 	 Our	 concern	 is	 reflected	 in	 comments	
made	by	 the	New	Zealand	Court	of	Appeal	 in	Shortland	v.	Northland	Health	Ltd104	
that	 ‘we	 cannot	 see	 formal	 ethical	 consultation	 as	 having	 been	 necessary	 in	 the	
present	case	which	did	not	raise	significant	ethical	issues	as	such.		The	issues	arising	
were	essentially	ones	of	clinical	judgment,	not	ethics.’		This	is	a	quite	extraordinary	
statement	as	 this	was	a	case	 involving	a	63	year	old	man	with	diabetes,	end	stage	
renal	 failure,	 and	 dementia.	 	 He	 was	 not	 accepted	 into	 the	 kidney	 transplant	
program,	and	his	family	was	told	that	dialysis	would	be	discontinued.	
	
Of	course,	not	all	decision‐makers	have	failed	to	see	the	ethical	issues	involved	and	
to	 take	 them	seriously.	 	The	coroner	 in	 the	 Inquest	 into	 the	death	of	Paulo	Melo105 
recognised	the	importance	of	ethical	 issues	and	recommended	the	formation	of	an	
ethics	committee	to	help	with	similar	cases.106	
	
The	Victorian	Civil	 and	Administrative	Tribunal	 in	Re	BWV107	also	 recognised	 that	
‘[the	 application]	 raises	 moral,	 legal	 and	 ethical	 questions	 of	 a	 profound	 and	
fundamental	 nature,	 questions	 literally	 of	 life	 and	 death	 ...’.108	 	 In	 Re	 SAJ,109	 the	
Queensland	 Guardianship	 and	 Administration	 Tribunal	 (as	 it	 then	 was)	 heard	
evidence	 from	an	 ethicist	 before	providing	directions	 in	 a	 contested	matter	 about	
whether	life‐sustaining	treatment	should	be	continued	or	withdrawn.	
	
It	matters	 a	 great	 deal	 if	 the	 judges	 reduce	 everything	 only	 to	 the	 clinical.	 	 If	 the	
issues	 are	 regarded	 as	 entirely	 clinical,	 there	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 deference	 to	
doctors.		If	it	is	recognised	that	issues	are	also	ethical	and	philosophical,	then	there	
is	more	 likely	 to	be	recognition	of	 the	 limits	on	doctors’	knowledge	and	expertise,	
and	the	conclusion	that	it	is	not	appropriate	to	defer	entirely	to	them.110			
	
	
4.3.2	 Role	of	doctors	
	
The	 earlier	 point	 about	 the	 role	 of	medicine	 leads	 into	 the	 next	 concern	we	have	
that,	 under	 the	 current	 system,	 the	 starting	 point	 is	 to	 accept	 the	 doctor’s	
assessment	of	futility	rather	than	a	patient’s	or	sdm’s	assessment	that	life‐sustaining	
treatment	should	be	provided.		As	decisions	are	not	(or	should	not	be	thought	to	be)	
entirely	 clinical	 ones,	 we	 argue	 that	 this	 starting	 point	 is	misguided,	 and	 doctors	
should	 not	 hold	 this	 privileged	 position	 of	 decision‐maker	 where	 the	 treatment	
would	be	effective	to	prolong	life	and	the	patient	or	sdm	wants	it	to	be	provided.			
	
																																																								
104	[1998]	1	NZLR	433.	
105	[2008]	NTMC	080.	
106	[2008]	NTMC	080,	[110].	
107	[2003]	VCAT	121.	
108	[2003]	VCAT	121,	[4]	citing	from	the	judgment	of	Sir	Thomas	Bingham	MR	in	Airedale	National	
Health	Service	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	AC	789,	808.	
109	[2007]	QGAAT	62.	
110	See	further	section	4.3.2	below.	
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The	cases	also	testify	to	the	deference	afforded	to	doctors	in	this	field.		The	courts	in	
Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand	 have	 shown	 significant	 deference	 to	 doctors.111	 	 We	
would	argue	that	this	deference	has	been	undue.		
	
Doctors	can	be	wrong	when	judged	by	a	standard	other	than	the	dominant	medical	
model.		If	they	rely	solely	on	the	‘gold	standard’	of	the	randomised	clinical	trial,	they	
may	 discount	 diagnoses	 and	 prognoses	 based	 on	 ‘traditional	 knowledge’	 and	
experience	 in	non‐dominant	 cultures.	 	 For	 example,	 a	 patient’s	wife	might	believe	
that	traditional	Chinese	remedies	might	be	able	to	treat	her	husband’s	cancer.		She	
might	 reject	 the	health	 care	 team’s	position	 that	he	 should	have	a	do	not	 attempt	
resuscitation	order	placed	on	his	 chart.	 	 She	might	want	 full	 treatment	 for	 the	six	
weeks	 that	 she	 believes	 it	 will	 take	 before	 they	 can	 know	 whether	 the	 Chinese	
remedies	 will	 work.	 	 It	 may	 be	 appropriate	 in	 some	 circumstances	 for	 these	
alternative	bases	for	decision‐making	to	be	determinative.	
	
In	addition,	doctors	are	not	due	deference	on	moral	 judgments,	and	best	 interests	
and	most	futility	assessments	involve	moral	as	well	as	medical	 judgment.	 	Doctors	
do	not	have	privileged	 access	 to	 values,	 as	 contrasted	with	 clinical	 conclusions	or	
‘medical	facts’,	and	what	is	in	a	patient’s	best	interests	is	not	merely	a	matter	of	their	
clinical	 condition.	 	 As	 considered	 above,	 whether	 treatment	 is	 ‘worth	 doing’	 as	
contrasted	with	‘won’t	work’	(as	is	most	often	the	meaning	of	futility	in	the	cases),	
depends	on	value	judgments.			
	
This	 problem	 can	 be	 exacerbated	 in	 circumstances	 of	 cultural	 difference	 between	
the	 health	 care	 professional	 and	 the	 patient	 and	 patient’s	 family.	 	 Values	 can	 be	
culture‐based	 and	 if	 a	 health	 care	 professional	 does	 not	 understand	 the	 patient’s	
culture,	 he	 or	 she	 may	 not	 understand	 the	 values	 at	 play	 for	 the	 patient.	 	 The	
Victorian	case	of	Re	Herrington,112	considered	earlier,	may	be	an	illustration	of	this.		
It	will	be	recalled	that	Ms	King	was	an	Aboriginal	woman	in	a	persistent	vegetative	
state.	 	The	 family	did	not	want	antibiotics	and	artificial	nutrition	 to	be	withdrawn	
because	of	 the	 cultural	 importance	of	 caring	 for	 the	unwell.	 	 The	Court	ultimately	
accepted	the	views	expressed	by	the	doctors	and	declined	to	interfere.		
	
Furthermore,	 some	 health	 care	 professionals	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 have	 biases	
regarding	disability	 in	 that	 they	may	value	 the	quality	of	 the	 life	of	 the	 individual	
lower	 than	 the	 person	 living	with	 the	 disability.	 	 The	 case	 of	 Baroness	 Campbell,	
considered	earlier,	 is	an	example	of	 such	differing	perceptions.	 	 	Such	biases	have	
also	attracted	judicial	attention.113	
	
																																																								
111	See,	for	example,	Justice	Howie	in	Messiha	v	South	East	Health	[2004]	NSWSC	1061,	[25]	[relying	
on	O’Keefe	J	in	Northridge	v	Central	Sydney	Area	Health	Service	(2000)	50	NSWLR	549,	[24]	as	
support	for	this	position],	[28].	
112	[2007]	VSC	151.	
113	See,	for	example,	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	R	(Burke)	v	General	Medical	Council	[2006]	QB	273,	303	
and	Justice	O’Keeffe	in	Northridge	v	Central	Sydney	Area	Health	Service	(2000)	50	NSWLR	549,	[56].	
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Deference	 to	 doctors’	 judgments	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 life,	 as	 is	 inherent	 in	 best	
interests	and	futility	judgments,	is	therefore	undue	at	best.	
	
The	current	framework	which	assigns	doctors	the	role	of	decision‐makers	regarding	
whether	or	not	treatment	should	be	provided	offends	many	of	the	values	articulated	
in	section	2.		Respect	for	a	person’s	autonomy	demands	that	he	or	she	should	make	
decisions	 about	 their	 treatment	 as	 they	 (or	 their	 sdm)	 are	 in	 a	 better	 position	 to	
know	what	treatment	the	patient	wants	or	would	want.		The	framework	also	has	the	
potential	to	offend	the	value	of	humility	as	it	does	not	require	the	doctor	to	defer	to	
the	 expertise	 of	 others	 in	 the	 decision‐making	 process,	 and	 a	 doctor	 might	 be	
tempted	to	make	a	 treatment	decision	without	considering	 important,	non‐clinical	
factors.	 	As	decision‐maker,	 the	doctors’	 conscience	 is	 privileged	over	patients’	 or	
their	sdm’s	conscience.		Depending	on	the	approach	taken	by	individual	doctors,	the	
value	 of	 procedural	 fairness	 could	 potentially	 be	 compromised.	 	 A	 decision	 about	
treatment	that	is	made	by	a	doctor	without	consultation	with	the	patient	or	sdm,	or	
a	 consultation	 which	 occurs	 without	 comprehensive	 and	 effective	 disclosure	 of	
relevant	 information	 and	 treatment	 options	 will	 offend	 the	 value	 of	 procedural	
fairness.		And	a	doctor	who	makes	a	decision	that	treatment	should	not	be	provided	
to	a	person	with	a	disability	on	the	basis	of	his	or	her	own	quality	of	life	assessment,	
as	occurred	in	the	case	of	Baroness	Campbell,	offends	the	value	of	equality.			Finally,	
access	 to	 justice	 is	 not	 maximized	 (even	 in	 Australia	 where	 such	 disputes	 are	
generally	 resolved	 in	guardianship	 tribunals)	as	 the	burden	 for	 conflict	 resolution	
rests	on	the	patients	and	their	sdms.	 	A	system	in	which	the	patient	or	sdm	makes	
the	decision	would	avoid	these	problems	(or	potential	problems)	and	promote	these	
critical	values.	
	
4.4	 Onus	problems		
	
This	 section	 deals	 with	 who	 should	 be	 responsible	 for	 certain	 actions.	 	 The	 first	
issue	concerns	who	should	be	required	to	take	action	when	doctors	want	to	stop	(or	
not	provide)	 treatment	but	 the	patient	or	sdm	wants	 it	provided.	 	The	second	 is	a	
broader	 issue	 and	 concerns	 whether	 it	 is	 the	 judicial	 system	 or	 parliament	 that	
should	be	responsible	for	developing	the	law	in	this	field.	
	
4.4.1	 Onus	for	invoking	dispute	resolution	processes		
	
Under	 any	 regulatory	 model,	 disagreements	 about	 treatment	 will	 occur	 at	 times	
between	the	health	care	team	and	the	patient	or,	more	likely,	the	patient’s	family	as	
sdm.		It	is	important	to	have	dispute	resolution	procedures	that	are	fair,	accessible	
and	efficient.		For	the	most	part,	guardianship	tribunals	and	boards	satisfy	the	need	
for	accessibility	and	efficiency.	 	There	 is,	however,	 room	for	 improvement.	 	As	the	
law	now	stands,	there	is	generally	no	requirement	for	doctors	to	provide	treatment	
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they	 assess	 to	 be	 futile	 and	 the	 onus	 is	 on	 the	 patient	 or	 family	 to	 make	 the	
necessary	steps	to	challenge	that	decision.114			
	
We	 can	 identify	 four	 reasons	 why	 the	 burden	 of	 challenging	 a	 doctor’s	 futility	
assessment	should	not	rest	with	the	patient	or	sdm	but	rather,	the	onus	should	be	
on	 the	 doctor	 or	 institution	 to	 bring	 the	 action.115	 	 Firstly,	 the	 family	 will	 not	
necessarily	 even	 know	 that	 the	 doctor	 has	 decided	 to	 withhold	 or	 withdraw	
treatment,	so	will	not	know	to	initiate	a	process	to	challenge	that	decision.	 	This	is	
particularly	so	in	relation	to	decisions	to	withhold	treatment	as	the	family	may	well	
be	unaware	of	the	possibility	of	receiving	the	treatment	that	was	considered	but	not	
offered.	 Secondly,	 even	 if	 they	 are	 aware	 that	 a	decision	 to	withhold	or	withdraw	
has	 been	 made,	 they	 would	 not	 necessarily	 know	 that	 they	 can	 challenge	 the	
decision	in	a	legal	forum.		Thirdly,	there	is	a	power	imbalance,	and	they	may	not	feel	
empowered	to	instigate	such	a	challenge	(and	possibly	may	feel	that	their	loved	one	
will	 not	 get	 good	 care	 if	 they	make	 such	 a	 challenge).	 	 Fourthly,	 it	 may	 cost	 the	
family	more	to	launch	the	action	than	to	defend	against	it,	and	the	family	will	usually	
have	less	financial	resources	at	their	disposal	than	the	doctor	or	institution.		
	
Under	the	current	model	of	regulation,	the	onus	is	on	the	family	to	bring	the	action	if	
they	disagree	with	the	doctor.	 	The	values	of	procedural	fairness,	access	to	 justice,	
and	perhaps	even	humility	require	that	the	view	of	the	family	is	followed	or,	if	the	
doctor	is	not	prepared	to	provide	the	treatment	on	futility(not	worth	doing)	grounds,	the	
onus	is	on	the	doctor	or	institution	to	bring	the	action.			
	
It	is	important	to	note	here	that	we	are	not	arguing	against	doctors	and	institutions	
having	access	to	a	dispute	resolution	process.		There	will	be	times	when	a	patient’s	
sdm	will	not	be	acting	in	accordance	with	the	patient’s	best	interests	or	according	to	
what	the	patient	would	have	wanted.	 	There	can,	of	course,	be	 financial	and	other	
conflicts	of	interest	operating	and	sdms	can	also	be	mistaken	about	a	patient’s	prior	
wishes	 or	 best	 interests.	 	 Doctors	 and	 institutions	 should	 have	 an	 avenue	 to	
challenge	improper	or	mistaken	decisions	taken	by	patients’	sdms.		Our	point	here	is	
simply	that	they,	rather	than	the	patients’	sdms	should	bear	the	onus	for	 invoking	
the	dispute	resolution	process.	
	
4.4.2	 Onus	for	making	law	through	courts	instead	of	legislatures	
	
Unilateral	withholding	and	withdrawal	cases	frequently	come	to	the	courts	at	a	time	
of	crisis.  The	case	of	Messiha	v	South	East	Health116	is	a	good	example.		The	patient	
																																																								
114	Note,	however,	that	a	doctor	in	Queensland	may	need	authorization	to	withhold	or	withdraw	
treatment	if	the	sdm	is	refusing	to	consent	to	its	withholding	or	withdrawal.		See	further	3.1	above.			
115	The	suggested	approach	has	also	received	judicial	endorsement:	Re	T	(Adult:	refusal	of	medical	
treatment)	[1992]	4	All	ER	649,	663;	Re	B	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[2002]	2	All	ER	449,	
474,	475.	
116	[2004]	NSWSC	1061.		For	further	case	examples	of	decisions	that	were	made	in	a	time‐pressured	
context,	see	Northridge	v	Central	Sydney	Area	Health	Service	(2000)	50	NSWLR	549,	Melo	v	
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was	a	75	year	old	man	who	suffered	a	cardiac	arrest	and	his	brain	was	deprived	of	
oxygen	for	at	least	25	minutes.		He	was	unconscious	and	apparently	in	a	deep	coma,	
and	was	admitted	to	the	intensive	care	unit.		He	was	being	artificially	ventilated	and	
receiving	artificial	hydration	and	nutrition.	 	The	health	care	 team	believed	that	no	
further	 treatment	 would	 be	 in	 the	 patient’s	 best	 interests	 and	 wanted	 to	 stop	
aggressive	 treatment.	 	Without	 such	 treatment,	 the	patient	would	 surely	die.	 	The	
family	disagreed	with	 the	decision	and	wanted	 the	 court	 to	 issue	an	 injunction	 to	
compel	the	health	care	professionals	to	continue	this	treatment.		The	patient	was	at	
significant	risk	if	the	doctors	proceeded	to	withdraw	the	treatment.	Obviously,	the	
decision	needed	to	be	made	quickly. 
	
Yet	making	law	(as	opposed	to	merely	applying	settled	law)	in	crisis	mode	does	not	
allow	adequate	time	for	the	lawyers	involved	to	carefully	research	and	develop	their	
arguments.117	 	 In	addition,	 the	novel	or	rare	nature	of	these	applications	generally	
means	that	there	is	not	a	large	number	of	experienced	lawyers	to	be	involved.		How	
many	of	the	lawyers	involved	in	the	various	cases	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand	had	
ever	argued	a	 futility	case	before?	 	How	many	even	knew	about	 the	debate	 in	 the	
bioethics	 literature	 let	alone	had	read	the	many	papers	written	on	this	topic	since	
the	1980s?		How	many	could	get	meaningfully	up	to	speed	on	the	issues	in	12	or	24	
hours?	
	
Similarly,	making	law	(again,	as	opposed	to	merely	applying	it)	in	crisis	mode	does	
not	 allow	 adequate	 time	 for	 judges	 to	 work	 through	 the	 legal	 arguments	 and	
prepare	carefully	drafted	reasons.	 	Despite	 the	growing	numbers	of	 these	kinds	of	
cases	arising	 in	Australia	and	New	Zealand,	 there	 is	no	equivalent	of	Airedale	NHS	
Trust	 v	 Bland,118  a	 case	 in	 which	 the	 relevant	 legal	 arguments	 have	 been	 fully	
explored	 and	 jurisprudence	 developed	 in	 detailed,	 lengthy	 and	 considered	
judgments.	The	limited	capacity	to	develop	the	law	in	a	carefully	considered	way	has	
been	 judicially	 recognised.119	 The	 uncertainty,	 inconsistency,	 and	 conceptual	
problems	with	the	law,	as	identified	earlier,	demonstrate	this	point.			
	
Finally,	 there	 is	a	human	cost	 to	developing	 law	through	 individual	cases.	 	Making	
law	on	 the	 backs	 of	 individuals	who	 are	 very	 ill	 and	 their	 families	who	 are	 going	
through	such	difficult	times	and	health	care	professionals	who	are	trying	to	do	what	
they	think	is	best	puts	a	huge	burden	on	all	of	them.	It	is	one	thing	to	have	to	go	to	
court	 as	 a	place	of	 last	 resort	where	 the	 court	needs	only	 to	 review	evidence	put	
before	it	to	resolve	conflict	over	what	should	be	done	for	a	particular	patient	in	the	
																																																																																																																																																																					
Superintendent	of	Royal	Darwin	Hospital	[2007]	NTSC	71,	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney‐
General	[1993]	1	NZLR	235;	State	of	Queensland	v	Astill	(Unreported	decision,	Supreme	Court	of	
Queensland,	Muir	J,	18	January	2006).	
117	Indeed,	in	Slaveski	v	Austin	Health	[2010]	VSC	493,	a	man	acted	on	his	own	behalf	in	a	Supreme	
Court	application	to	prevent	Austin	Health	from	withdrawing	life‐sustaining	treatment	from	his	
father,	and	the	Court	commented	on	the	difficulty	in	obtaining	relevant	material	in	such	
circumstances:	[3].		He	obtained	legal	representation	later	in	the	application.	
118	[1993]	AC	789.	
119	See	Thomas	J	in	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney‐General	[1993]	1	NZLR	235,	243.	
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face	 of	 irreconcilable	 conflict	 between	 the	 health	 care	 team	 and	 the	 patient’s	
family.120	 	 It	 is	 quite	 another	 to	 have	 to	 go	 to	 court	 and	 spend	 time	 arguing	 over	
what	the	law	is	and	requires	and	then	over	how	to	apply	the	law	to	the	facts	of	the	
case.121		Yet	this	is	precisely	what	is	required	given	the	failure	of	the	legislatures	to	
act.	
	
The	possibility	of	a	comprehensive	solution	to	this	problem	and	the	opportunity	to	
advance	the	rule	of	law	through	enhanced	certainty	both	point	to	legislation	as	the	
appropriate	vehicle	 through	which	 reform	should	occur.	 	 So	 too	does	 the	value	of	
access	to	justice.		
	
4.5	 Covert	allocation	of	health	resources	
	
For	 the	 most	 part,	 the	 law	 asks	 doctors	 to	 make	 individual	 treatment	 decisions	
based	on	a	patient’s	best	interests	without	considering	resource	allocation	issues.122		
However,	we	know	that	that	is	not	what	happens.		Doctors	in	charge	of	departments	
with	 limited	 beds	 (e.g.,	 intensive	 care	 units)	 make	 resource	 allocation	 decisions.		
Sometimes	 these	 decisions	 are	 dressed	 up	 as	 decisions	 grounded	 in	 conclusions	
about	 the	 futile	 nature	 of	 the	 treatment,	with	 a	 denial	 that	 there	 is	 any	 rationing	
going	 on.	 	 However,	 except	 where	 the	 treatment	 is	 not	 able	 to	 help	 a	 patient	 (ie	
treatment	 is	 futile	 because	 it	 ‘will	 not	work’),	 there	may	 be	 a	 resource	 allocation	
component	 to	 the	decision.	 	The	problem	 is	 that	our	 current	 system	of	 regulation	
has	not	yet	properly	addressed	the	intersection	of	the	specific	issue	of	treatment	of	
individual	patients	and	the	broader	systemic	issue	of	the	allocation	of	scare	health	
resources.	
	
The	 current	 system	 which	 does	 not	 separate	 the	 issue	 of	 allocation	 of	 health	
resources	 from	decisions	 about	 treatment	 in	 individual	 cases	offends	 the	 value	of	
distributive	justice.		The	system	fails	to	ensure	that	health	resources	are	distributed	
in	a	fair	way.		And	if	we	accept	that	resourcing	decisions	are	being	made	by	doctors	
and	 those	 decisions	 affect	 patient	 treatment,	 the	 system	 also	 offends	 the	 value	 of	
procedural	fairness	and	transparency	in	decision‐making.	
																																																								
120	Examples	of	this	kind	of	conflict	can	be	found	in	Northridge	v	Central	Sydney	Area	Health	Service	
(2000)	50	NSWLR	549;	Messiha	v	South	East	Health	[2004]	NSWSC	1061;	Melo	v	Superintendent	of	
Royal	Darwin	Hospital	[2007]	NTSC	71.		
121	Examples	of	end	of	life	cases	where	clarification	was	needed	include	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	
Attorney‐General	[1993]	1	NZLR	235;	Re	G	[1997]	2	NZLR	201;	State	of	Queensland	v	Astill	
(Unreported	decision,	Supreme	Court	of	Queensland,	Muir	J,	18	January	2006);	Hunter	and	New	
England	Area	Health	Service	v	A	(2009)	74	NSWLR	88;	Brightwater	Care	Group	v	Rossiter	(2009)	40	
WAR	84.	
122	Messiha	v	South	East	Health	[2004]	NSWSC	1061;	Melo	v	Superintendent	of	Royal	Darwin	Hospital	
[2007]	NTSC	71,	[9].		Note,	however,	that	the	situation	might	be	different	where	a	decision	not	to	
provide	treatment	is	based	on	guidelines	specifically	developed	to	ration	finite	resources	such	as	for	
organ	transplantation	or	access	to	dialysis	programs.		In	Shortland	v	Northland	Health	Ltd,	a	case	
about	a	patient’s	access	to	dialysis,	both	the	High	Court	(unreported,	6	November	1997,	Salmon	J)	
and	the	Court	of	Appeal	([1998]	1	NZLR	433,	443)	indicated	that	resource	constraints	could	be	a	
relevant	factor	when	decisions	are	made	about	treatment.		
	
	 34
	
	
5.	 A	Proposed	Model	
	
From	the	paper	so	far,	 it	will	be	clear	that	we	favour	a	change	to	the	law:	a	doctor	
should	not	be	able	 to	withhold	or	withdraw	unilaterally	on	 the	basis	of	her	or	his	
opinion	 that	 treatment	 is	 ‘futile’,	 not	 in	 the	 ‘best	 interests’	of	 the	patient	or	 is	not	
‘good	medical	 practice’	 or	 ‘appropriate	medical	 treatment’.	 	 And	while	 the	 broad	
principles	 of	 our	 proposed	 approach	 have	 been	 flagged	 in	 the	 discussion	 to	 this	
point,	in	this	section,	we	draw	together	these	principles	and	articulate	the	elements	
of	our	proposed	model.	
	
A	preliminary	point	to	be	made	here	is	that	we	propose	reform	should	occur	by	way	
of	statute.		This	would	avoid	the	deficiencies	outlined	above	which	arise	when	law	is	
developed	 through	 the	 courts.	 	 A	 comprehensive	 legislative	 model	 is	 preferable	
from	both	rule	of	law	and	access	to	justice	perspectives.		Courts	and	tribunals	would	
continue	to	have	a	role	in	resolving	disputes	about	what	should	be	done	in	the	face	
of	 conflict	 in	particular	 cases	but	 they	should	be	being	asked	 to	apply	 rather	 than	
make	the	law.	
	
5.1		 A	shift	of	decision‐making	power	
	
At	 the	heart	of	our	model	 is	a	 shift	of	decision‐making	power	 from	doctors	 to	 the	
patient	 and	 his	 or	 her	 sdm.	 	 This	 authority	 to	 decide	 is	 qualified	 (as	will	 be	 seen	
below)	and	can	be	challenged	but	 it	 represents	a	 starting	point	as	 to	who	has	 the	
authority	to	make	a	decision	about	treatment	or	non‐treatment.	 	Such	an	approach	
better	gives	effect	to	the	values	of	life	and	autonomy;	that	decisions	about	medical	
treatment	 begin	 with	 the	 patient,	 particularly	 where	 the	 proposed	 decision	 is	 to	
stop	 treatment	 leading	 to	 his	 or	 her	 death.	 	 This	model	 also	 better	 advances	 the	
value	of	 equality	 as	 it	 imposes	 a	barrier	 to	doctors	 inappropriately	determining	 a	
life	is	not	worthwhile	based	on	considerations	such	as	age	or	disability.			
	
Our	 approach	 establishes	 a	 legal	 process	 that	 promotes	 the	 values	 of	 procedural	
fairness,	access	to	justice	and	humility.		By	locating	the	decision‐making	power	with	
the	patient	and	sdm,	a	doctor	and	 the	health	system	need	 to	engage	with	 them	 in	
making	decisions	and	a	doctor	is	prevented	from	unilaterally	deciding	to	stop	or	not	
start	 treatment.	 	 Entrenching	 this	 process	 in	 the	 law	 requires	 the	 provision	 of	
information,	 discussion	 with	 a	 patient	 about	 possible	 treatment	 options	 and	
transparent	 decision‐making	 (procedural	 fairness).	 	 It	 places	 the	 burden	 of	
challenging	a	decision	about	the	provision	of	treatment	on	those	who	can	best	carry	
it,	namely	the	doctors	and	the	health	system	(access	to	justice).	And	it	embeds	in	the	
decision‐making	process	appropriate	recognition	and	a	role	for	non‐clinical	values,	
and	limits	the	role	of	medicine	and	doctors	accordingly	(humility).	
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5.2		 Provide	 requested	 treatment	 that	 can	work	except	 if	 lawful	
excuse	
	
It	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	 article	 to	provide	 the	details	 and	mechanics	 of	how	
statutory	 reform	 should	 be	 effected,	 but	we	 outline	 the	 principles,	 given	 the	 core	
values	discussed	earlier,	that	we	argue	should	operate.			
	
5.2.1		A	duty	to	provide	the	necessaries	of	life	
	
The	starting	point	is	that	doctors	should	continue	to	have	an	obligation	to	provide	
patients	 with	 the	 necessaries	 of	 life,	 and	 patients	 should	 be	 able	 to	 request	
treatment	that	 fits	within	this	definition.	 	As	noted	earlier	 in	this	article,	we	reject	
the	more	qualitative	approach	of	Thomas	J	in	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney	
General,123	 and	 instead	 recommend	 that	 this	 term	be	 defined	 in	 a	 common	 sense,	
factual	 manner	 to	 mean	 simply	 treatment	 that	 is	 necessary	 to	 sustain	 life.	 	 If	
treatment	 is	 capable	 of	 sustaining	 life,	 it	 will	 be	 a	 necessary	 of	 life	 regardless	 of	
whether	you,	I	or	the	doctor	might	think	it	is	not	worth	doing.		This	avoids	sophistry	
and	the	lawfulness	of	a	non‐treatment	decision	turning	on	subjective	judgments	of	
doctors	(and	so	advances	the	value	of	the	rule	of	law).			
	
This	 also	means	 that	 there	will	 be	 a	 duty	 to	 provide	 a	wider	 range	 of	 treatments	
than	presently	is	the	case,	but,	it	should	be	emphasised,	there	will	not	be	a	duty	to	
provide	 all	 treatment.	 	 The	 concept	 of	 treatment	 that	 ‘will	 not	 work’,	 such	 as	
antibiotics	 for	 a	 virus,	 was	 discussed	 above	 and	 such	 treatment	 will	 not	 be	 a	
necessary	of	 life	 ‐	 it	 is	not	 capable	of	 sustaining	 life.	 	This	means	 there	will	be	no	
duty	 to	 provide	 such	 treatment	 and	 a	 patient	 or	 sdm	will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 lawfully	
require	it	to	be	given.		
	
5.2.2		A	lawful	excuse	not	to	treat	
	
But	what	of	the	remaining	treatment	that	would	constitute	a	necessary	of	life?		Can	a	
patient	or	sdm	always	request	such	treatment	and	must	a	doctor	always	provide	it?	
We	recommend	that	the	circumstances	in	which	a	doctor	 is	not	obliged	to	provide	
necessaries	 of	 life	 be	 clearly	 articulated.	 	 These	 circumstances	would	 provide	 the	
doctor	 with	 a	 ‘lawful	 excuse’	 for	 not	 providing	 treatment.	 	 We	 set	 out	 these	
circumstances	below.				
	
Receiving	consent	to	withhold	or	withdraw	treatment,	or	other	authorization		
	
A	doctor	 should	be	excused	 for	not	providing	 treatment	 if,	 after	 consultation	with	
the	patient	or	legally	authorised	sdm,	including	any	statutory	officer	who	has	such	
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authority,124	consent	 is	given	to	withhold	or	withdraw	the	treatment.	 	This	excuse	
should	also	extend	to	consent	contained	 in	a	valid	advance	directive,	or	 to	a	court	
order	or	tribunal	decision.		This	also	reflects	the	shift	outlined	above	to	patients	and	
sdms	as	the	decision‐maker.	
	
Existence	 of	 a	 valid	 statutory	 regime	 or	 government	 or	 institutional	 resource	
allocation	policy		
	
Earlier	 in	 the	paper	we	recognised	that	 there	are	 limits	 to	when	treatment	can	be	
provided.		Recognising	such	limits	is	consistent	with	the	value	of	distributive	justice.		
Rationing	 of	 health	 care	 is	 inevitable	 and	 ethically	 appropriate.125	 	 However,	 we	
have	argued	it	must	be	done	overtly,	not	covertly,	and	it	needs	to	happen	through	a	
process	that	reflects	the	value	of	procedural	fairness.		
	
Rationing	may	 need	 to	 occur	 both	 at	 a	 governmental	 level	 through	 enactment	 of	
legislation	 or	 development	 of	 departmental	 policies.	 	 It	 may	 also	 occur	 at	 the	
institutional	level	through	hospitals	developing	policies	that	are	specifically	tailored	
to	 their	 own	 circumstances.	 	 This	 will	 no	 doubt	 be	 challenging.	 	 Broad	 and	
meaningful	 consultation	 is	 necessary,	 as	 is	 ensuring	 that	 the	 composition	 of	 any	
drafting	team	is	representative	of	stakeholders,	particularly	those	who	are	likely	to	
be	adversely	affected	by	such	policies.	 	Yet	such	an	exercise	is	critical	to	develop	a	
reasoned,	coherent,	ethical	and	just	response	to	this	vexed	issue.	
	
Regardless	of	 the	mechanism	used,	 the	statutes	and	policies	need	to	be	developed	
according	 to	 administrative	 law	 principles	 and	 human	 rights	 norms	 and	must	 be	
consistent	with	the	values	we	have	identified	above.		Doctors	should	be	excused	for	
not	providing	treatment	pursuant	to	such	legislation	or	policies.	
	
Physical	impossibility		
	
There	may	be	 some	situations	 in	which	 treatment	 is	 a	physical	 impossibility.	 	For	
example,	 there	 may	 be	 no	 dialysis	 machine	 or	 oncology	 services	 in	 the	 town	 in	
which	 the	 patient	 lives	 or	 can	 travel	 to.	 	 A	 doctor	 should	 not	 be	 liable	 for	 not	
providing	 the	necessaries	 of	 life	where	 it	 is	not	physically	possible	 to	do	 so.	 	 It	 is	
likely	that	such	conduct	would	not	be	unlawful	in	any	event,	even	without	an	excuse,	
as	 civil	 or	 criminal	 liability	 is,	 as	 a	 rule,	 not	 imposed	 for	 failing	 to	 do	 something	
which	 is	 impossible.	 Nevertheless,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 clarity	 and	 completeness,	 this	
should	still	be	specifically	 included	 in	 the	 legislative	scheme	as	providing	a	 lawful	
excuse	for	non‐treatment.	
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Transfer	of	the	patient	to	a	doctor	who	will	provide	the	desired	treatment	
	
The	value	of	enabling	a	doctor	to	act	in	accordance	with	his	or	her	conscience	was	
recognised	 earlier.	 	 A	 doctor	 should	 not	 be	 required	 to	 provide	 treatment	 to	 a	
patient	if	treatment	is	contrary	to	his	or	her	conscience,	 if	 it	 is	possible	to	transfer	
the	 patient	 to	 a	 doctor	 willing	 and	 able	 to	 provide	 that	 treatment.	 	 However,	 if	
transfer	is	not	possible,	treatment	should	continue	until	there	is	some	other	lawful	
excuse	not	to	treat.	
	
	
5.3	 Likely	impact	of	the	model	
	
We	anticipate	that	there	are	at	least	two	likely	impacts	of	the	proposed	model,	both	
of	 which	 will	 have	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages.	 	 The	 first	 is	 that	 it	 is	 likely	 to	
result	in	more	communication	between	doctors	and	patients	and	their	sdms,	leading	
to	greater	transparency	in	decision‐making.		For	example,	under	our	model,	where	a	
patient/sdm	 is	 asking	 for	 treatment	 that	 simply	 will	 not	 work,	 doctors	 should	
explain	 this	 to	 the	 patient/sdm	 and	 indicate	 that	 they	will	 not	 provide	 it.	 	Where	
potentially	 life‐sustaining	treatment	exists,	but	 is	physically	 impossible	 to	provide,	
again	 they	should	explain	 this	 to	 the	patient/sdm.	 	Where	 there	 is	potentially	 life‐
sustaining	 treatment	 but	 provision	 is	 precluded	 by	 a	 valid	 resource	 allocation	
policy,	 they	 should	 again	 explain	 this	 to	 the	 patient/sdm.	 	 But	where	 there	 is	 no	
lawful	 excuse	 for	 non‐treatment,	 the	 doctor	 should	 offer	 the	 various	 treatment	
options	 to	 the	 patient/sdm,	 along	 with	 his	 or	 her	 professional	 advice	 as	 to	 the	
appropriateness	of	various	courses	of	action.		Under	the	current	law,	which	permits	
unilateral	medical	decision‐making,	some	of	these	discussions	can	be	avoided.		But	a	
shift	 in	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 how	 these	 decisions	 are	made	will	 promote	 greater	
engagement	by	doctors	with	patients	and	their	sdms.			
	
A	 disadvantage	of	 this	 first	 impact	 is	 that	 communication	 like	 this	will	 take	more	
time,	 and	 time	 is	 a	 precious	 commodity	 in	medical	 practice.	 	However,	we	would	
also	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 an	 advantage	 of	 a	 legal	 framework	 to	 formalise	 and	 promote	
good	 communication.	 	 Further,	 ethical	principles	 of	 good	medical	practice	already	
require	 patient/sdm	 participation	 and	 consultation	 in	 decision‐making126	 so	 the	
sorts	of	discussions	mentioned	above	should	already	be	happening	to	some	extent.			
	
A	second	 likely	 impact	we	can	 foresee	 is	 that	 increased	 information	sharing	and	a	
shift	 in	 decision‐making	 authority	may	 lead	 to	 a	 small	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	
cases	 requiring	 dispute	 resolution.	 	 Under	 our	 model,	 if	 a	 conflict	 arising	 from	 a	
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patient	or	sdm	request	 for	 treatment	cannot	be	resolved,	 the	doctor	should	either	
transfer	the	patient	to	another	doctor	willing	and	able	to	provide	the	treatment	or,	if	
that	is	not	possible	(and	there	is	no	other	lawful	excuse	available),	continue	to	treat	
and	 seek	 authorization	 to	 withhold	 or	 withdraw	 treatment	 from	 a	 court	 or	 a	
tribunal.		The	vast	majority	of	disputes	that	currently	occur	are	resolved	by	effective	
communication.127		There	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	this	would	not	continue	to	
be	 the	 case	under	our	model.	We	would	argue	 that	 concerns	about	 the	 floodgates	
opening	and	a	large	volume	of	disputes	arising	are	misplaced.	
	
That	 said,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 number	 of	 disputes	 occurring	will	 be	more	 than	 at	
present	 where	 doctors	 can	 make	 decisions	 not	 to	 offer	 treatment	 which	
patients/sdms	 never	 know	 about,	 or	 make	 decisions	 that	 patients/sdms	 lack	 the	
resources	and	ability	to	challenge	through	a	formal	dispute	resolution	process.		But	
this	begs	another	question	–	are	those	decisions	ones	that	should	be	allowed	to	be	
made	 without	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 dispute	 being	 raised,	 discussed,	 and	 resolved	
through	more	formal	means?			
	
To	 say	 that	 more	 disputes	 requiring	 resolution	 is	 a	 bad	 thing	 in	 and	 of	 itself	
presumes	 that	 the	 decision‐making	 which	 is	 not	 presently	 being	 contested	 is	
appropriate.	We	argue,	for	reasons	outlined	earlier,	that	this	is	not	the	case.		Indeed,	
the	model	we	have	designed,	which	draws	on	principles	such	as	 transparency	and	
information	sharing	promoted	by	procedural	fairness	and	other	values,	will	improve	
the	quality	of	decision‐making.	 	Our	view	 is	 that	 if	 there	 is	a	small	 increase	 in	 the	
number	of	cases	that	need	dispute	resolution,	that	cannot	be	said	to	be	a	bad	thing.		
If,	after	extensive	communication,	a	dispute	remains	where	a	patient	or	sdm	has	a	
different	 view	 from	 a	 doctor	 as	 to	 whether	 life‐sustaining	 treatment	 should	 be	
provided,	then	we	would	argue	that	such	a	dispute	is	one	that	should	be	tested	and	
resolved	through	an	appropriate	mechanism.		Given	a	person’s	life	is	at	stake,	a	fair	
and	transparent	process	to	decide	whether	he	or	she	should	receive	treatment	is	a	
reasonable	response	from	the	law.	
	
	
6.	 Conclusion	
	
In	section	2	of	this	article,	we	identified	and	explained	the	values	(and	the	balancing	
of	values)	 that	we	argued	 should	ground	 the	 legal	 framework	 in	 this	 area.	 	Those	
values	were:	 life,	 autonomy,	 equality,	 the	 rule	of	 law,	distributive	 justice,	 fairness,	
access	 to	 justice,	 conscience	 and	 humility.	 	 We	 then,	 in	 section	 3,	 gave	 a	 brief	
overview	of	the	law	in	this	area	which	generally	concluded	that	doctors	are	granted	
significant	 powers	 to	 make	 decisions	 to	 withhold	 or	 withdraw	 potentially	 life‐
sustaining	treatment	unilaterally.	 	This	 law	was	then	critiqued	in	section	4	against	
the	values	earlier	outlined.		We	identified	problems	of:	uncertainty,	complexity,	and	
inconsistency	in	this	area;	that	key	legal	concepts	are	unclear	or	understood	in	ways	
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that	are	 incompatible	with	common	sense	usage	of	 language;	 that	 the	 law	permits	
overreach	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 role	 of	 both	medicine	 and	 doctors	 with	 respect	 to	
decision‐making	 in	 this	area;	 that	 the	design	of	 the	 law	imposes	burdens	on	 those	
who	 should	 not	 have	 to	 carry	 them;	 and	 that	 the	 current	 law	 permits	 covert	
rationing.			
	
The	 model	 that	 we	 proposed	 in	 section	 5,	 based	 upon	 a	 shift	 from	 doctors	 to	
patients	 and	 sdms	 as	 decision‐makers,	 addresses	 our	 concerns	 about	 the	 current	
legal	 framework.	 	 We	 anticipate	 that	 some,	 perhaps	 many,	 will	 not	 endorse	 the	
suggested	approach.		Nevertheless,	we	advocate	this	model	to	further	the	important	
values	 that	 should	 underpin	 a	 legal	 framework	when	making	 decisions	 about	 life	
and	death.		We	also	predict	that	the	cultural	shift	this	model	requires	is	perhaps	not	
as	great	as	may	be	 imagined	at	 first	glance,	particularly	 for	doctors	who	currently	
engage	 patients	 and	 families	 in	 a	 genuine,	 meaningful	 and	 respectful	 way	 in	
discussions	about	treatment	at	the	end	of	life.		Our	hope	is	that	the	adoption	of	this	
model	 will	 improve	 outcomes	 for	 all,	 particularly	 better	 care	 for	 those	 who	 are	
dying	and	their	families.	
